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Abstract
This Living Review presents an overview of the research on European identity in the
context of EU governance by focusing on central debates in the political science literature. It
departs from the problems of disagreement between European citizens and their elites as well
as the lack of a European demos. Against this background, the article discusses the functions
of collective identity including the legitimation function and solution of collective dilemmas.
Here, two perspectives pertaining to these functions are depicted: first, the issue of European
public space and second, the integrative workings of European citizenship. Next, the article
explores the conceptual and methodological problems of the research on European collective
identity. In particular, it focuses on the conceptual ambiguity of the collective identity term,
causes of confusion in European identity research and problems of operationalization and
measurement. Following this, the article discusses the literature on identity technologies of
the EU and identifies the shortcomings of identity technologies with regard to EU governance.
Keywords: European identity, governance, legitimacy, democracy, public opinion, European
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1 Introduction: Justifying the relevance of a European col-
lective identity
Facing enormous challenges while lacking strong support among the European citizens, the Euro-
pean Union is vulnerable to unpredictable stress. Hence, some research on European integration
deals with two crucial questions: how much pressure can the community tolerate in order to persist
and what holds the EU together in times of scarcity, conflict, danger, and threat? Looking for
answers to these questions, a multitude of publications stress the need for societal cohesion among
the people. The gradual emergence of a sense of community among European citizens is said
to be a means of overcoming centrifugal tendencies due to the increased heterogeneity of today’s
European Union of 27 member states and nearly 500 million people.
Certainly, David Easton (1965: 186; 1979: 188) conceded that it is in principle possible “to
bind a group together before feelings of mutual identification have emerged”. People’s beliefs in the
benefits of working together, for instance, could also hold a group together. Thus, we-feelings come
as a result rather than a precondition of cooperation (Easton 1979: 325; Westle 1999: 92). However,
this cannot be an option in the long term and under all circumstances. Some cohesive cement or
we-identity is perhaps not relevant “to the possibility of a political community but to its duration
under stress” (Easton 1965: 187 – emphasis added). At the European level three main factors
are producing stress: permanent legitimacy shortfalls, impending deficiencies of effectiveness and
the uncertainty of the European community’s borders. In fact, some researchers suggest that the
idea of a European collective identity is most notably a phenomenon of crisis. Bo Str˚ath (2002:
388f) has pointed out in this context that the European identity concept was delineated at the
EC Copenhagen summit in 1973. Against the background of the oil price shock, the abstract idea
of a collective European identity should have been used as an instrument in order to consolidate
Europe’s place within a crisis-ridden international world order. Strath’s argument corresponds
with a general observation: Critical junctures in human history have repeatedly turned out to be
cornerstones for collective identity building since “identities become salient and are fought over in
particular historical moments, especially in times of crisis” (Risse 2010: 2).
Other students of European integration, however, consider the development of a European col-
lective identity as an essential prerequisite for further integration. Given the size of the European
Union and the dissimilitude of its member states, the elite’s scope of action within unanimity is in-
creasingly shrinking. In order to guarantee both the efficiency and effectiveness of EU governance,
the use of the majority rule will be demanding more concessions from EU citizens in the future.
Hence, an influential strand of research on European integration assumes that the emergence of
a resilient we-identity among Europeans is an essential precondition for the people’s willingness
to show solidarity throughout Europe inasmuch as they accept re-distribution policies (Scharpf
1999; Zu¨rn 2000; Grimm 2004). Along with classical thinkers like John Stuart Mill (1861: 391),
this branch of research also argues that collective identity is a necessary condition for democratic
decision-making. An unconditional resilient feeling of commonness, so the argument goes, makes
the political minority trust that the ruling majority would not exploit its power position at the
minority’s expense (Offe 2003: 246; Kielmansegg 1996, 2003; Ho¨reth 1999; Maurer 2002). Fi-
nally, these scholars suggest that a European collective identity is entrenched in the Europeans’
consciousness of sharing a common fate. This awareness may reinforce, in turn, the mutual willing-
ness to work together by pursuing common goals and solving collective problems that go beyond
the capacities of single nation-states (Kaina 2006: 129).
This line of argument is challenged by those scholars who criticize the idea of a shared European
collective identity. An important representative of that point of view is Thomas Risse (2010). On
the one hand, he questions the need for a “uniform and shared European identity above and beyond
national identities” and stresses the Europeanization of national (and other collective) identities
instead (Risse 2010: 5). Through Europeanization, so his argument goes, “Europe and the EU
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(become) integrated in people’s sense of belonging” (ibid. 5) and “references to Europe and to the
EU [. . . ] incorporated into one’s sense of national belonging” (ibid. 25). On the other hand, Risse
concedes “the more the EU moves beyond regulatory policies toward redistribution and taxing
Europeans, (EU citizens’) secondary identification with Europe might reach its limits” (ibid. 8).
Obviously, the question of whether the EU really does need a shared European identity cannot be
answered without giving an answer to the question of what the European Union actually is.
Research literature which deals with the landmarks of European unification (Laffan 1998;
Thomas 2006) agrees that today’s EU is quite different from the functional agency (Mitrany 1966:
145) and the economic Zweckverband (Ipsen 1972) of preceding integration years. Intensified by
the Maastricht Treaty of 1993, the European unification path has developed a power structure of
supranational authority (Bach 1999, 2000). Scholars on European integration widely agree, there-
fore, that the European Union is taking roots as a new type of governance (e.g., Marks et al. 1996;
Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1997; Kohler-Koch 1999; Jachtenfuchs 2000; Stone Sweet et al. 2001;
Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch 2004). As for the “identity question,” it does not really matter
if we describe the EU as a multi-level system of governance or a political system. It is sufficient
to say that today’s European Union shows some features of a full-fledged national polity (Hix
2005: 2ff; Lepsius 2006: 11; Hix and Høyland 2011: 12ff) while it lacks other characteristics of a
modern polity. In particular, the EU is not a state (Bo¨ro¨cz and Sarkar 2005: 155). Moreover, the
so-called input dimension of a political system is still underdeveloped at the European level (Kaina
2009). Thus, we describe the current nature of the EU as a “polity in between” which governs
citizens of a certain territory within “a stable and clearly defined set of institutions for collective
decision-making and a set of rules governing relations between and within these institutions” (Hix
2005: 2). As a result, the European Union can be analyzed as a political collectivity inasmuch as
a supranational authority, a Weberian Herrschaftsverband, has been established at the European
level. Against this background, Risse’s Europeanization argument seems to underestimate the
need for a European sense of community in today’s European Union in order to legitimize both
re-distribution policies and majority rule in political decision-making (see also Section 2.2).
During the past years there has been a surge of interdisciplinary publications on the Europeans’
we-feeling. On the one hand, some literature concerns the content of a common European identity.
On the other hand, numerous philosophers, historians, sociologists and political scientists have
dealt with the prospects of a European identity and the obstacles to a shared sense of community
at the European level. In addition, there is a growing body of literature on technologies of collective
identity construction applied by the EU. This Living Review presents an overview of the research
on European identity in the context of EU governance by focusing on central debates in the political
science literature.
2 European identity and the problem of the EU’s legitimacy
2.1 Beyond the permissive consensus: How to bridge the gap to the
publics
The academic attention to the emergence of a European collective identity has been substantially
influenced by the pace and scope of the European integration process. Despite the repeated calls
for bringing “the Union closer to its citizens” (quoted in Kohler-Koch 2000: 525; see also van
Kersbergen 2000: 11; Lodge 1994), “Europe” is still far from its citizens. The people’s cognitive
and emotional detachment from the EC/EU was hardly a severe problem as long as the so-called
permissive consensus (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970) allowed the national and European elites to
push the European unification forward. However, this matter obviously belongs to the past. As
the European community has enlarged and the integration process has reached a deeper level, the
progress in European unification is increasingly susceptible to swings in public mood (Thomassen
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2009; Fuchs and Klingemann 2011). The growing relevance of public opinion becomes dramatically
apparent by the fact that numerous EU projects have been rejected by popular vote: the Maastricht
Treaty in Denmark (1992), the accession of Norway (1972, 1994), the Nice Treaty in Ireland (2001),
the introduction of the euro in Sweden (2003), the European Constitutional Treaty in France and
the Netherlands (2005) and the Lisbon Treaty in Ireland (2008).
In addition to such visible signs of disagreement between European citizens and their elites,
research on public opinion suggests the end of the permissive consensus.1 A wealth of empirical
examinations provide evidence that citizens’ support for European integration has been decreasing
since the early 1990s (e.g., Hix 2005: 151; 2008: 51ff; Deutsch 2006; Hooghe 2007; Hooghe and
Marks 2007; Taylor 2008: 24–31; Kaina 2009, Hix and Høyland 2011: 109). The very literature
on the euroskepticism phenomenon (e.g., Taggart 1998; Kopecky´ and Mudde 2002; Lubbers and
Schepers 2005, 2010; Fuchs et al. 2009b; Leconte 2010; Boomgarden et al. 2011) fortifies that
Europe suffers from the “Post-Maastricht Blues” (Eichenberg and Dalton 2007) and that the
permissive consensus has been displaced by a “constraining dissensus” (Hooghe and Marks 2006:
248). Moreover, empirical research also confirms that citizens’ support for European unification
widely depends on cost/benefit calculations and economic expectations (Gabel and Palmer 1995;
Anderson and Reichert 1995; Anderson and Kaltenthaler 1996; Gabel and Whitten 1997; Gabel
1998a,b,c; Cichowski 2000; Tucker et al. 2002; McLaren 2002, 2004, 2006, 2007; Eichenberg and
Dalton 2007). Over the course of the post-Maastricht process, these considerations have been
complemented by another dimension centering on the protection of national interests, especially
the national community and forms of collective identity that the traditional nation state has
conveyed (Hooghe 2007: 7; see also: Carey 2002; McLaren 2002, 2004, 2006, 2007; Hooghe and
Marks 2007: 121; Hooghe and Marks 2004, 2005, 2009; Duchesne 2008; Fligstein 2010). Yet this
kind of utilitarian support is unstable inasmuch as the attitudes towards the European Union and
the integration process rest on short-termed instrumental evaluations rather than on normatively
embedded convictions.
The EU’s challenge of bridging the gap to the publics opened the door for researchers who
suppose that a shared sense of European community is crucial for further steps in European
integration (e.g., Herrmann and Brewer 2004; Risse 2004; Bach, Lahusen, and Vobruba 2006a;
McLaren 2006; Bruter 2005; Kaina 2006, 2009; Fligstein 2010). This assumption is closely linked
to the debate on the European democratic deficit and the EU’s legitimacy shortfalls.
2.2 Challenging the EU’s democratic capability: The no demos thesis
In view of the downward trend of citizen support for European integration as well as the challenges
of enlarging and deepening the EU, it can be asked if the previous permissive consensus would still
be sufficient in order to continue the European story of success. Realizing a sort of (multi-level)
governance, the EU is facing the challenge of justifying political rule since every form of governance
limits the self-determination and individual freedom of people. However, legitimizing European
governance becomes harder the more the European integration process succeeds. This “paradox
of success” arises from three developments revealing the transforming character of the European
Union as a “polity in between.”
The first development describes the erosion of the permissive consensus (Lindberg and Schein-
gold 1970). For a long time, this specific melange of common citizen support for European inte-
gration and widespread indifference of the European publics (e.g., Hix 2005: 149, McLaren 2006:
8, Kaina 2009: 88f) has conceded a generous room of maneuver for national and European elites
to push the integration process onward. By now, research on public opinion corroborates the end
of the permissive consensus (see Section 2.1).
1 For public perceptions of the EU as a system of governance see the Living Review by Loveless and Rohrschneider
(2011)
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A second development refers to impending shortfalls in the effectiveness of the European multi-
level system. In the wake of broadening the EU’s scope of governance, Simon Hix (2008: 31)
diagnosed a “policy shift” at the European level. After the successful creation of the internal
market, the EU policy agenda is now focused on the question of “what economic and social policies
should be pursued in the new European-scale polity” (Hix 2008: 89). The change of the European
policy agenda is accompanied by an increasing conflict potential inasmuch as European decision-
making involves re-distributive consequences. As a result, coalition-building between the European
Commission, Council and European Parliament becomes more difficult and makes policy-gridlock
at the European level more likely (Hix 2008: 44ff).
The diagnosis of Hix is tightly related to a third development, growing distribution conflicts at
the supranational level, which was particularly visible during the recent currency and debt crisis
in the EU. The success of the European integration process has led to a stage where suprana-
tional decision-making increasingly affects the general living conditions of EU citizens (Bach et al.
2006b: 7, Vobruba 2007: 10). The aforementioned “policy change” and the resulting growth of
re-distributive European decision-making comes with the risk of increasing distribution conflicts
at the European level which were formerly resolved within EU member states (Lepsius 1999: 210,
Vobruba 2003: 41,48, Bach 2006: 25). As a consequence of the European policy change and the
increased heterogeneity of EU members, this “Europe” in which most of Europeans do not take
interest creates winners and losers and cannot continue to guarantee Pareto-rational results any-
more (Joerges 1999, Føllesdal and Hix 2006: 11, Hix 2008: 48). The more EU citizens become
aware of this consequence, the more success and legitimacy of the integration process depend on
the EU’s social cohesion and the union’s capability for societal integration.
Against this background, the well-known debate on the European democratic deficit and the
EU’s legitimacy shortfalls has grown heated as the scope of European governance has extended (e.g.,
Weiler, Haltern, and Mayer 1995; Abromeit 1998; Beetham and Lord 1998; Eriksen and Fossum
2000; Lord 2001, 2007; Føllesdal and Hix 2006; Goodhart 2007; Kaina and Karolewski 2007; Kohler-
Koch and Rittberger 2007; Hix 2008; Kaina 2009). On the one hand, there are some scholars
who doubt that the European Union suffers from a severe democratic deficit (Moravcsik 2002,
2004, 2006; Zweifel 2002a,b) or question whether the EU’s technocratic nature has to necessarily
be in accordance with democratic standards, since its legitimacy is founded on its contribution
to problem-solving (Majone 1994, 1996, 1998; Wessels 2003; Moravcsik 2004, 2006). On the other
hand, the mainstream of political science literature on European integration intensely criticizes the
lack of democratic control, accountability and responsibility as well as the insufficiency of input
structures for European citizens to effectively influence political decisions at the supranational
level (e.g., Weiler, Haltern, and Mayer 1995; Abromeit 1998; Lord 2001; Føllesdal and Hix 2006;
Kohler-Koch and Rittberger 2007). Except for the skeptical views of some students of European
integration who deny the need for more democracy at the European level, a majority of political
scientists dealing with the European Union assume that the EU needs further democratization to
cope with the present and upcoming legitimacy problems of European governance.
Several researchers, however, do not believe in the possibilities of the EU’s further legitimization
by democratization until all the peoples of the European Union share a strong or “thick” European
sense of community (Bo¨ckenfo¨rde 1991: 344ff, Kielmansegg 1996, 2003, Offe 2003, Scharpf 1999,
Zu¨rn 2000, Dahrendorf 2003). The debate on the democratic capability of the European Union was
actuated by the claim that the use of the majority rule in collective decision-making is bound to
certain socio-cultural prerequisites in order to avoid heteronomy (Kielmansegg 1996: 48; Hix 1998:
53; Zu¨rn 2000: 195; Decker 2002: 258ff; Haltern 2007: 49–51). This strand of literature argues that
there has first to be an answer to the question of “Who is the people?” before government can be
organized democratically. Any answer to this question, in turn, has to decide who belongs to “us”
– and who does not. Accordingly, a shared sense of community is supposed to be the indispensable
precondition that makes group members consider the results of democratic decision-making as an
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expression of self-determination, even though the consequences of this process conflict with one’s
own interests (Decker 2002: 263). In this context, some scholars controvert that there can be a
European sense of community in the foreseeable future (Kielmansegg 1996, 2003; Grimm 1993,
1995; Scharpf 1999). According to Peter Graf Kielmansegg (1996, 2003), the most determined
representative of this school of thought, there is no European demos sharing a collective identity
because the European level lacks a community of communication, collective experiences and com-
mon memories. Yet, such communities create and stabilize collective identities. This dilemma, so
the argument goes, condemns the European Union to remain an undemocratic construction.
Other researchers object to this claim. Some of them point to empirical studies that already
show some evidence for the emergence of a European collective identity (e.g., Everts and Sinnott
1995; Niedermayer 1995; Scheuer 1999; Fuchs 2000; Schild 2001; Risse 2002, 2004; Westle 2003a;
Citrin and Sides 2004; Bruter 2005, 2007; Hurrelmann 2005; Deutsch 2006; Scheuer and Schmitt
2009; Fligstein 2010). Others basically suspect that European citizens may develop a shared sense
of community with their European fellows in the future (Kohli 2000; Meyer 2004). A third group
supports this optimism by arguing that the democratization of the EU will help engender a strong
European collective identity (Habermas 1996, 2001; Fuchs 2000; Zu¨rn 2000; Decker 2002; Eriksen
and Fossum 2004; Føllesdal and Hix 2006). Scholars of the second and third group see a broad,
common value base among the Europeans which is supposed to be a sufficient fundament in order
to constitute a European demos and to legitimize a democratic order at the European level (Fuchs
2000: 233; Fuchs and Klingemann 2002: 20).
However, the confident belief in the development of a European collective identity by democ-
ratization remains vulnerable inasmuch as it postulates a connection that has to be proven in
reality. This leads to two further challenges for research on this topic. First, there is still a need
for systematic studies to clarify whether the link between the democratization of the EU and the
development of a European sense of community among the citizens is conditional or causal in
nature. This is important since any progress in democratizing the European Union comes with
the danger of aggravating given legitimacy shortfalls of the EU precisely because there is no re-
silient sense of community among the Europeans. This peril results from the specific “burdens” of
democracy since democratic decision-making is principally open and generates winners and losers.
For this reason, we need more theoretical and empirical insights into why, first and foremost, and
whether more democracy at the European level might contribute to the emergence of any kind
of we-identity among the European citizens. This knowledge is required both for scholars and
political practitioners in order to balance the risks of democratizing the European Union without
a European demos.
Second, the belief in positive impacts of the EU’s democratization on the materialization of a
European sense of community confronts researchers as well as politicians with a temporal squeeze
(Kaina 2009). This is a “dilemma of simultaneity” in that the European Union has to improve its
democratic quality and establish beneficial conditions for the development of a European collective
identity at the same time. On the one hand, EU governance has reached an advanced stage so that
the future of the European unification increasingly depends on the citizens’ consent as well as the
mitigation of legitimacy shortfalls by democratizing the European Union. On the other hand, more
democracy at the European level is accompanied by the risk of tightening legitimacy problems of
EU governance as long as there is no resilient European sense of community among the European
citizens. This quandary of time might not only increase conflicts between member states but also
create a severe test for the Union’s cohesion. However, it might also stimulate a new research
agenda dealing with the question of how this temporal dilemma of the European Union could
be attenuated. Efforts in this direction are requested inasmuch as research on European identity
highlights several functions of a collective European identity for the democratic governance in the
EU.
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2.3 Functions of collective European identity
Research on collective identity building at the European level discusses at least two main functions
of a European we-identity, including the increase in the legitimacy of EU governance and its
persistence or stability, for instance through the solution of cooperation dilemmas.
2.3.1 Collective identity, legitimacy and the European public space
One school of thought in particular attempts to connect collective identity with legitimacy of
governance in the EU. It does this, for instance, through a notion of integrated public sphere al-
lowing for community-wide communication.2 Inspired by the writings of Ju¨rgen Habermas, it is
argued that the post-national democracy in Europe relies on the emergence of a European com-
municative space that fulfils functions of a public sphere (Habermas 1974: 49–55; 1995: 109–131).
The public sphere is expected to connect civil society3 to the power structure of the governance
both by enabling citizens’ opinion formation and by giving the citizens the power to influence
the decision-making. In other words, the public sphere is a deliberative political space in which
both government and civil society participate (Dı´ez Medrano 2009: 91). In this sense, the public
sphere is essential for citizens to realize their claims to democratic self-government. However, it is
expected to be an integrated public space, pervading the entire community, rather than a number
of disconnected functional public spaces in which citizens debate only narrow and specific issues.
The corresponding collective identity which develops in the process of citizens’ participation in
the public sphere does not rest on origin-based or heritage-orientated identification, but rather on
the practice of constructing commonality through communication processes which are expected to
generate a collective self-understanding (Baumeister 2003: 740–758).
In the context of the EU, the public sphere perspective regards European citizens primarily
as community members. In this sense, public space promotes collective identity by anchoring
citizens in a community. However, belonging to a community does not have to be underpinned
by pre-political bonds, since the public sphere is capable of generating collective identity through
participation, communicative opinion formation and autonomous lawmaking. Public spheres cre-
ated as such rest on a reflexive identity, i.e., a shared understanding of commonality coupled with
recognition of difference (Schmalz-Bruns 1999: 185–224).
A number of authors argue that a new public space is actually emerging in the European
Union. This new public space is associated with the institutions of the EU and their supranational
development that transcends the boundaries of the nation-state. Philip Schlesinger (1999: 263–279)
argues that the multi-level political system of the EU also generates multilevel forms of political
communication that include lobbying, information campaigns and news reporting. However, this
complex communicative activity occurs not in an integrated European public arena network, but
rather in fragmented and even contradictory sub-arenas. As a result, Schlesinger suggests that we
should rather assume a system of interrelated (but not integrated) spheres of European publics.
Apart from this, there is an asymmetry in the structure of the European publics. The growth of
transnational media such as newspapers, magazines and television news sustains a rather restricted
elite space rather than encouraging generalized access to communication by European publics,
which confirms the “democratic deficit” understood as an elite-citizenry divide (Schlesinger 1999:
276).
While Schlesinger still observes an elite-citizenry divide in the European publics, Eriksen and
Fossum apply the differentiation between strong and general publics to examine European public
space (Eriksen and Fossum 2002: 401–424). The concept of strong publics refers to institutionalized
2 More about this debate can be found in the Living Review “The EU as a public sphere” by de Vreese (2007).
3 The role of civil society in the EU context is elaborated in more detail in the Living Review “Civil society
participation in EU governance” by Heidbreder (2012).
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deliberations which are also part of the public (but in a condensed and more routinized form) and
are close to the centre of the political system. This proximity vis-a`-vis the centre of the political
system denotes the decision-making power of strong publics which reaches beyond the opinion or
will formation (general publics) outside the formal political system.
As a rule, strong publics relate to parliamentary assemblies and other deliberative institutions
with formally organized structures which possess a codified stake in the decision-making process,
whereas general or weak publics have merely moral influence (Brunkhorst 2002: 677). For Eriksen
and Fossum (2002: 411) and many other scholars, it is the European Parliament (EP) which fulfils
the function of a strong public in the EU. In contrast to the Council, the EP is more consensus-
orientated and likely to be open for deliberation, as majorities can be more easily formed in the
absence of the traditional division between government and opposition. Since the EP is directly
elected by the peoples of the member states, it can claim to be an expression of the will of the people,
and thus the only direct democratic body to represent European interests (see also Rittberger 2006:
1211–1229). Moreover, the EP has, over the past half century, been successively empowered by
the member states (Rittberger 2003: 203–225; Rittberger 2005; Maurer 2003: 227–247).
Furthermore, Eriksen and Fossum count European conventions (both the Charter Convention
and the Constitutional Convention) as types of strong publics. They are believed to institutionalize
communicative interaction, but are believed to do so beyond a mere aggregation of preferences, as is
the case with the Intergovernmental Conferences. In the conventions, participants deliberated in an
open debate which was not only open to a variety of actors (such as parliamentarians, civil society
actors etc.), but also had features of representatives assemblies. Therefore, the conventions assumed
a stronger normative force, as they were no longer entirely dominated by executive and technocratic
actors (Eriksen 2005: 354; Eriksen and Fossum 2002: 416). Nevertheless, Eriksen (2005: 358)
comes to a similar conclusion as Schlesinger: even though there are signs of an integrated public
sphere with easy and general access for citizens, dominating and salient are segmented publics
which show problems of fragmentation and communication distortions. Under these circumstances,
collective will formation is difficult, and a collective identity cannot be presumed. Even the strong
publics specialized in collective will formation cannot fulfil the integrative function and cannot
induce a general collective will.
A more optimistic view of European public space and its fruitful role in creating European
democratic governance is presented by Trenz and Eder (2004: 5–25). Trenz and Eder put the
function of public sphere in the context of social learning of political actors. Through interactions
in the public sphere, citizens experience each other as contingent others and they develop individual
coping strategies. In the case of the EU, we deal with a transnational public sphere which has the
potential to unfold a transnational communicative resonance (Trenz and Eder 2004: 9; Eder 2007:
33–50).
Since we can observe a growing communication network in the EU, the conclusion about a
transnational resonance might not be so far-fetched. In this perspective, the more collective actors
are contingent on the public, the more likely processes of collective learning contributing to the
development of transnational democracy in the EU are. Since constitutional reform of the EU
is bound to the public performance of the EU, there are learning processes which create public
resonance. In the process, networking actors present their activities before the general public and
evoke its reactions either in the form of consent and loyalty or in the form of protest and voice. For
Trenz and Eder (2004: 18), it was the European Convention that assumed the function of a vehicle
transforming the particularistic and non-public lobbying practices specific to the EU governance
into a distinct mode of communication with the public.
However, not all EU institutions establish a communication mode of interaction with the pub-
lic. Since information about political processes is a prerequisite for debates in the public sphere,
it is relevant to know, for instance, how the Commission communicates with the public. The
study conducted by Patrick Bijsmans and Christina Altides (Bijsmans and Altides 2007: 323–340;
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also van de Steeg 2002: 499-519) suggests that the Commission and the national media empha-
size different aspects of the EU political process which, instead of integrating the communication
structures in Europe, does the opposite. It does not even result in a superficial integration of the
European communication sphere, which would be a precondition for European citizens to act. This
perspective represents the notion of European governance being supported through mass media by
creating an informed and involved public, which is a prerequisite for democratic governance in the
EU.
The lacking transcendence of the European national spheres and the consequent fragmentation
of the public sphere in the EU is also indicated in other studies. The study by Downey and Ko¨nig
(2006) indicates that even if there is an obvious European reference, such as in the Berlusconi–
Schulz case, similar framing of events does not occur in a way that would encourage deliberation
among citizens, since the actors involved in the conflict are portrayed as representatives of ethnic
nations rather than their respective political parties. Consequently, ethnicity shows more persever-
ance than expected, and makes deliberative change of opinion less probable due to communication
difficulties (Downey and Ko¨nig 2006: 165–187).
However, even within an integrated public space, communication might not be sufficient to
generate collective identity. In this case, the EU’s strategies to improve democratic legitimacy
by strengthening its publicity will necessarily fail. This thin understanding of public sphere and
democracy may cause inappropriate institutional measures to be chosen in order to generate public
attention. In this sense, the EU would confound public space with public relations and transparency
with publicity. Therefore, improving democratic legitimacy of the EU would require more than
just publishing decisions and seeking attention (Hu¨ller 2007: 563–581).
Even though there is still a lot if disagreement between scholars on the existence and workings
of the European public sphere, a consensus seems to emerge that the main problem is not the
lack of a European public sphere per se but rather its thinness. Many authors accept that a
pan-European public sphere is not in sight and therefore focus on the so-called Europeanization
of national public spheres. This research aims to determine how much information on the EU is
conveyed in the national press in comparison to coverage of national news. In this vein, Thomas
Risse (2010) argues that the increasing presence of the European Union in national press has
politicized European identity and created a European public sphere in which the same questions are
increasingly addressed in different states. In particular, this Europeanization of the national public
spaces occurs “the more the same (European) themes are controversially debated at the same time
at similar levels of attention across national public spheres and media and the more similar frames of
reference, meaning structures and patterns of interpretation are available and in use across national
public spheres and media” (Risse 2010: 125). In addition, these Europeanization processes are
accompanied by transnationalization processes in which Europeanized identities and public spaces
reinforce each other: “The more a transnational community of communication emerges in which (a)
European and other national speakers regularly participate in cross-border debates, (b) speakers
and listeners recognize each other as legitimate participants in transnational discourses that (c)
frame the particular issues as common European problems” (Risse 2010: 126). This leads Risse
to conclude “the emergence of Europeanized public spheres and communities of communication
constitutes a polity or reflects the emergence of a polity” and “a European polity comes into
being not through the creation of prepolitical demoi but through Europeanized public spheres in
which European issues are contested and debated” (Risse 2010: 174). This optimistic Habermasian
position leads to counterintuitive conclusions, where the politization of the EU, for instance through
the negative referenda in France and the Netherlands to the Constitutional Treaty in 2005, might
signify “the birth of a transnational polity” rather than a mere legitimacy crisis (cf. also De Wilde
and Zu¨rn 2012).
Beyond the question of the “thinness” of such Europeanized identity, there might still be a
problem of its elitist focus, as pointed to above. As it appears, it is largely the elites that dominate
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the emerging sphere, leaving little room for citizens to participate (apart from referenda, which are
rare events). Beyond the quality press (which is the primary data for research on Europeanized
space), the research does not seriously engage with the studies on Europeanization of ordinary
citizens. Contrary to the predominantly elitist vision of transnational communication, Jonathan
White (2010a,b) highlights a profound indifference of ordinary citizens in the EU societies, their
political disaffection and ambivalence towards the EU which can have depoliticizing effects. White
shows how little Europeanization might take place in the everyday lives of ordinary citizens (for
instance the taxi drivers whom he interviews in three EU countries) and argues in favor of the
commonness in Europe rather than communication patterns (White 2010a). In the same vein,
Adrian Favell (2008) explores the private lives of 60 “pioneers of European integration”; educated
and highly-skilled “free movers” living in Amsterdam, Brussels, and London who decided to leave
their society of origin in order to live in one of the Eurocities. Favell’s work not only points to the
citizens’ enduring national attachment but also shows the resilience of the national society with
its exclusionary social mechanisms and institutional prejudices generating considerable difficulties
for even the highly educated European citizens from a different country.
The research by White and Favell shows that the problem of divide between Europeanization-
transnationalization of the elite discourses and Europeanization-transnationalization of the citizens
might still exist. It not only casts a shadow on the optimistic findings of the European public
sphere research but also questions the applicability of the thin identity concepts in the context of
distribution policies, solidarity and democratic deficit.
2.3.2 Collective identity, cooperation dilemmas and European citizenship
A further type of collective identity function relates to what is well-known in social sciences as
dilemmas of collective action (Olson 1965; Chamberlin 1974: 707–716). These dilemmas delineate
types of social situations in which individual rationality of interdependent actors leads to collec-
tively irrational outcomes (Axelrod 1980: 3–25; Howard 1988: 203–213). Collective dilemmas can
primarily be solved by using two methods. First, there is a third party with enough power to
change the sub-optimal outcome of the strategic constellation between actors. Second, there is a
social structure allowing for and stimulating repeated interactions between the same actors, thus
stabilizing expectations about each other, and even developing social resources such as trustwor-
thiness and credibility (Axelrod 1984, 1997). These social resources pertain to the reciprocity
which is expected to be promoted in the EU as a stable institution organizing actors’ interactions.
Under the circumstances of reciprocity, conflict potential is likely to be reduced and the chances
for cooperation increase. In this perspective, the EU is an example of a complex international
organization which not only links different policy fields but also generates social norms and knowl-
edge, thus giving rise to a social order (Gehring 2002). Even though interests of the politics actors
are still the major motivation for political action, they become modulated by norms of appropri-
ate behavior. Both social norms and reciprocity can thicken into collective identity, increasing the
chances of cooperation even further. The socialization (whose congealed form is collective identity)
is expected to modify actors’ preference formation from idiosyncratic to more collective-orientated.
This bridge-building socialization stresses the relevance of norms of appropriate behavior within a
collective (Zu¨rn and Checkel 2005: 1045–1079).
However, some authors argue that certain types of norms are more central than others for the
social and political order of the EU and, consequently, for the development of a collective identity.
Fundamental norms keep a community together, as they are linked with the polity level. For Antje
Wiener, one of the fundamental norms is citizenship pertaining to the rule of law, fundamental
freedoms and human rights, and democracy e rule of law, fundamental freedoms and human rights,
and democracy (Wiener 2006: 1308–1313; 2007: 1–7). The EU is an example not only of a complex
organization, but also one that encompasses diverse European societies. Therefore, the socializing
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function of citizenship appears to be particularly relevant. In other words, citizenship constitutes
actors and their interests, as it provides individuals with an understanding as citizens, thus shaping
interests and identities. The issue of citizenship mirrors the debate on how cohesive (to a certain
extent) a collective identity based on fundamental freedom and human rights can be. Human rights
promises to bridge differences and particular identities, but they also lack a thicker communitarian
component, as they are universalistic in their appeal. We could argue that bridging differences is
solely a precondition for a collective identity that entails attachment and reciprocity.
In this context, Andreas Føllesdal (2001: 313–343, esp. 315) regards European citizenship as a
central measure for increasing reciprocity and trust among the citizens of Europe. Here, European
citizenship is expected to act as an agent of collective identity. Citizenship as a special institution
is likely to habituate individuals into citizens by redirecting their interests and perceptions (at least
partially) towards the collective, whereby the individual inclination to free-ride is reduced and their
confidence in the behavior of others increases. Therefore, institutions such as citizenship (with a
built-in reference to collectivity) socialize individuals to abide by norms that generate cooperation.
Other authors go beyond the solution to the collective action dilemmas. Ireneusz P. Karolewski
(2010a) regards European citizenship as a moderate integrative device, since shared citizenship
identity does not eliminate differences, but can be expected instead to supersede rival identities.
As citizenship can assume different forms, its variance finds its reflection in the thickness and
strength of citizenship identity. Even though many different political identities can exist, such
as party identities or ideological identities, citizenship identity represents a master identity which
underpins citizens’ behavior in the public space. However, the extent to which citizenship becomes
consequential for collective identity depends on the type of citizenship and the type of identity
technologies involved (see also Section 4). Rights-orientated citizenship leads to the model of
liberal citizenship, obligation-accentuated citizenship spawns the republican model of citizenship
and compliance-focused citizenship produces the caesarean model of citizenship. These models
of citizenship are coupled with differently strong and resilient collective identities, and are thus
associated with specific collective identities. However, only the republican model of citizenship is
endowed with a strong and thick collective identity, as it propagates a cult of commonness in the
public space and focuses on the duties of the citizens in a democratic community. In comparison to
the strong collective identity of republican citizenship, the liberal model of citizenship is associated
with a notion of weak or thin collective identity. This rights-based citizenship focuses primarily
on the legal status of citizens. In this sense, it highlights the rights-component of citizenship
and underplays obligations and compliance. In contrast, the caesarean model of citizenship shows
features of strong collective identity in the cognitive sense, but it barely represents collective
identity in the political sense. Therefore, caesarean citizenship is associated with reaffirmation of
self-identity as a response to insecurity and existential anxiety.
However, there are increasingly more skeptical voices on the identity-creating power of European
citizenship (cf. Besson and Utzinger 2008; Koopmans 2012; Schmidtke 2012). One of them is the
work of Adrian Favell. Based on his aforementioned research on Eurostars, or residents of three
major Eurocities of Amsterdam, London and Brussels (Favell 2008), Favell (2010) goes further
and argues that the pioneers of the European mobility do not develop any European identity
based on European citizenship. For instance, the political rights guaranteed by the Maastricht
Treaty do not seem do play any relevant role in their lives, as Eurostars rarely vote in the cities
of residence. If they are interested in politics at all, their interest is limited to the politics of their
home country. Instead, they predominantly exercise European citizenship by reaping the benefits
of mobility in Europe as employees, consumers, neighbors and public service users. Consequently,
Eurostars legitimate the European integration project in a pragmatic way, rather than espousing
any political European identity.
Furthermore, some authors even point to an anti-civic potential of European citizenship, in
particular whenever it is directed at migrants of third countries as a way of establishing outside
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boundaries. For instance, Karolewski (2012) stresses that the EU’s immigration policies increas-
ingly use images and scenarios of threat from bogus asylum seekers who are presented by EU
agencies as a danger to the social integration and cohesion of European societies. Biometric
technologies, detention facilities and new methods of surveillance are employed to establish exclu-
sionary and restrictive immigration policies in the EU. Instead of generating trust and reciprocity,
these exclusionary practices tend to uphold or even strengthen collective feelings of insecurity, and
thus are likely to promote a culture of fear that makes citizens overreact to risks, rather than
resolve problems of security. Against this backdrop, European citizenship is not only associated
with transnational rights and mobility but also becomes linked to politics of insecurity (Huysmans
2006) and the demarcation between the citizen and the suspect, which can entail anti-civic effects.
As the EU shifts its focus from political participation and democracy towards the field of internal
security, it increasingly bases its legitimacy on the bureaucratic power of surveillance, control, sepa-
ration and expulsion. This development of European citizenship is likely to exacerbate the existing
democratic deficit of the EU through the expansion of executive powers, escape from democratic
accountability and overall secrecy surrounding security issues. Therefore, it could plunge the EU
even deeper into the democratic dilemma.
3 Concepts, notions and methods of research
3.1 Collective identity, problems of definition, and causes of confusion
in European identity research
Despite the multi-disciplinary relevance of the identity concept, there is no definition that every
scientist would agree on. Certainly, there is a comparatively broad consensus that the presence of
an “other” is an indispensable part of the identity concept (e.g., Tajfel 1982: 104; Wendt 1994:
389; Eisenstadt and Giesen 1995: 47; Hettlage 1999: 244; Delanty 2000: 115; Schlesinger 2000:
1873; Croucher 2004: 40; Rumelili 2004: 32; Lepsius 2006: 114; Bozˇic´-Vrbancˇic´ et al. 2008: 1018;
Anderson 2010: 46). But regarding the content of the term “identity,” ambiguity is not only a
typical trait of this notion but also its greatest impairment when it comes to its usefulness as
an analytical category. For this reason, some researchers even recommend giving up the identity
concept, since it is far too extensile to be of use for systematic inquiry (Brubaker and Cooper 2000:
1). Other scholars agree that “the notion of identity means quite different things to different people”
(Herrmann and Brewer 2004: 4), which is why “identity” prohibits not only an applicable, definite
and satisfying definition (Mayer and Palmowski 2004: 578) but also many approved methods of
measuring (Herrmann and Brewer 2004: 4, Huntington 2004: 41, Abdelal et al. 2009b, Fuchs
2011a). However, most students do not concur with the appeal of banishing the identity concept
from the social sciences because identity is too important for social life. They acknowledge that in
the long run, both individuals and human groups cannot live without identity. Having an identity,
so the argument goes, is a “psychological imperative” as well as a “sociological constant” (Greenfeld
1999: 38). Doing identity research without reference to the concept of “identity” would be like
research on democracy without the notion of “democracy.” Instead of surrendering, we need an
intensifying of our efforts in making sense of “identity” as an analytical category (see also Eder
2009).
Given the problems of defining identity commonly, the broad field of social sciences provides
a variety of conceptualizations of both individual and collective identity (Owens et al. 2010).
There are at least three main ideas of identity (Kaina and Karolewski 2006: 12): first, identity
as something collectives or individuals have; second, identity as something a group or a person is;
and third, identity as a resource persons or a group of people use, as something individuals or a
collectivity do. Whereas the first and the second idea dominate in the social sciences, the third idea
of identity can be found, for instance, in (socio-)linguistic approaches of identity research which is
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linked to an ethnomethodological/conversation analytic perspective (Triandafyllidou and Wodak
2003: 215; Cramer 2010).
Naturally, any term in the social sciences is more or less contentious and some concepts are
more open to dispute than others. Disagreement, however, is not synonymous with a lack of clarity.
Since “research that employs unclear concepts [. . . ] usually leads to poor analyses” (Nørgaard 2008:
4f), we need to elucidate the analytical categories we use. This is all the more important as our
inability to unambiguously specify the key concept for research on European identity comes with
the risk of producing a grave epistemological problem for at least three reasons.
First, without unambiguous concepts we cannot grasp reality in an appropriate way. Second,
lacking a clear concept specification we also run the risk of developing unsuitable operationalizations
and unfitting measuring instruments, which is why we cannot trust the validity and reliability of our
empirical findings. Finally, the more the definitions of a key concept vary, the greater the problems
for generalizing and communicating new insights since researchers often do not communicate with
each other and tend to disregard the work of their colleagues.4 In fact, there is some evidence in
the research literature on European collective identity that scholars from different perspectives –
for instance, from a normative or an empirical point of view – are prone to systematically ignoring
each other. The emergence and consolidation of communicative islands, however, undermines the
cumulative character of scientific research and hampers the progress of knowledge. Advancement
in research on “European identity” accordingly depends on whether we are able to consolidate
our empirical knowledge which, in turn, is contingent on our capability to make clear what we
are talking about when we refer to “collective identity” in general and “European identity” in
particular.
Examining a great deal of literature on European identity research, we found at least three
theoretical issues which are worth discussing in greater detail. These theoretical shortcomings
are the two-level problem in analyzing collective identities (Section 3.1.1), the issue of equating
“belonging to” with “belonging together” (Section 3.1.2), and finally, the drawback of confusing
collective identity with political regime support (Section 3.1.3). All of them contribute to scholarly
disarray and make it not only increasingly difficult to navigate through the state of the art on
European identity, but also impede advancement in the field of European identity research. In
the following, we will confirm our critique and present a proposal for conceptualizing European
identity research in order to ease observable scholarly schisms.
3.1.1 The two-level problem in analyzing collective identities
In their review of scholarly literature on identity, the sociologists Timothy Owens, Dawn Robinson
and Lynn Smith-Lovin (Owens et al. 2010: 490) pointed out that “(m)ost definitions of collective
identity include a notion of identification with shared features along with a recognition of shared
opportunities and constraints afforded by those features.” In his recent book, Thomas Risse (2010:
19) similarly noted that studying collective identity needs a clear distinction between the subjects
and objects of identification. Put differently, inquiry on collective identity has to make clear who
identifies with whom or what – and why or for which reason, we would like to add. Risse’s helpful
proposal benefits from being straightforward and uncomplicated. Its capacity to avoid confusion
in research on European collective identity is nonetheless constricted, mainly due to the two-level
nature of collective identities. Accordingly, collective identities relate to two subjects at different
4 Renowned political scientists, such as Sartori, do not only deplore a lack of conceptual rigor in our discipline
but also the emergence of so-called “communicative islands”. If scholars do not understand each other anymore
because they increasingly use their own notions and concepts (since they better fit their research interests than
other concepts) they tend to communicate in certain “conceptual circles” by more or less ignoring the work of other
“circles”. We believe this is also a consequence of the continuing specialization, fragmentation and hybridization of
our discipline. To be sure, our comprehensive examination of the research literature on “European identity” reveals
clear tendencies that certain conceptual or methodological “camps” neglect the work of other “camps”.
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analytical levels, namely individual(s) and/or a group of people. Therefore, Risse’s analytical
distinction can easily lose its clarity since a group of people can be both the subject and the object
of identification. If individuals identify with a group of people, the former is the subject and the
latter the object of identification. In contrast, a group of people is simultaneously object and
subject of collective identity if the group identifies with itself as a collectivity. In that case, the
group is a collective subject identifying with itself in terms of its key attributes, which makes it
unique and different from other groups.
The two-level problem of collective identity is all the more confusing when some scholars fail to
explicitly point out who precisely is the subject of a European collective identity (e.g., Pollack 2008;
Checkel and Katzenstein 2009; Eder 2009). Thus, in the case of research on collective identities,
the distinction between subjects and objects, as well as the reasons for identification, should be
supplemented by distinguishing between an individual level and a group or collective level (Smith
1992: 59f; Harrie 2006: 62; see also Duchesne 2008: 402, 403; Duchesne and Frognier 2008: 144,
145; Kaina 2009: 41).
This perspective offers two important advantages. First, a framework based on the aforemen-
tioned analytical distinctions might serve to structure the research agenda as well as to systemize
different perspectives and several approaches in previous research on European collective iden-
tity (see Table 1. Even more importantly, such a framework might guide us to “good research”
(Nørgaard 2008) by urging students of “European identity” to disclose their notion of “collective
identity,” justify their research focus and clarify their research puzzles.
Table 1: An analytical framework for research on European collective identity. Source: Kaina (2013).
Levels of collective identity
Collective or group level Individual level
Components of
Subject a group of people individuals
collective identity Object a group of people a group of people
Reason e.g.,
∙ a common story
∙ a set of values and principles
∙ similar collective experiences
∙ a common history and/or mem-
ory
individual’s perception of
sharing precious and ex-
clusive commonalities with
others
As for the second advantage, the framework shown in Table 1 is compatible with different
perspectives in previous research on “European identity” by avoiding a scholarly schism between
the collective and individual level of analyzing (European) collective identity. We will explain this
argument in greater detail.
We agree with Fuchs (2011a: 35) that much confusion in the research on “European identity”
can be traced back to at least two misunderstandings. The first disaccord exists between researchers
with an empirical approach on the one hand and scholars with a normative approach on the other.
The second misunderstanding is caused by the two-level problem in analyzing collective identities.
To begin with the first misunderstanding, empirical research on European collective identity
mainly deals with the question of whether, to what extent and for what reasons EU citizens
identify with the European Union as a group of people and their fellow European citizens (e.g.,
Duchesne and Frognier 1995; Duchesne 2008; Scheuer 1999; Risse 2002, 2004, 2010; Westle 2003a,b;
Bruter 2005, 2007; Citrin and Sides 2004; McLaren 2006; Green 2007; Scheuer and Schmitt 2007,
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2009; Kaina 2009; Thomassen 2009; Fligstein 2010). In contrast, normative research essentially
seeks to answer the question of what the content or substance of a European collective identity
could be. In doing so, most scholars dealing with the substance of “European identity” tend
to offer mere normative arguments by deducing the content of a European collective identity
from philosophical ideas, normative principles or legal documents (e.g., Delanty 1995; Habermas
2003; Habermas and Derrida 2003; Magnette 2007; Leiße 2009: 111–117; Prˇiba´nˇ 2009). However,
there are also studies which empirically explore the substance of a “European identity” using,
for instance, discourse analyses or surveys among elites and non-elites (e.g., Dı´ez Medrano 2003,
2009; Bruter 2004a; Antonsich 2008; Cerutti 2008; Jenkins 2008; Schildberg 2010; Risse 2010). We
accordingly feel that the momentous scholarly schism runs between the collective and individual
levels of analyzing (European) collective identity. Thus, the second misunderstanding in analyzing
(European) collective identity is caused by a biased focus on individuals who are seen as the
subjects of collective identities.
Researchers coming from a socio-psychological or sociological tradition consider collective iden-
tity to be equivalent to the “emotional sub-dimension” of social identity which, in turn, is part
of the individual’s self-concept (Esser 2001: 342, 345, Grundy and Jamieson 2007, Rutland et al.
2008, Fuchs 2011a). Those scholars consistently analyze collective identities at an individual ana-
lytical level since the subject of collective identity is a person who is related to a group of people
in a certain way. In fact, many students on collective identity in general and European collective
identity in particular consider any kind of collective identity as feelings of belonging to certain
human groups (e.g., Dı´ez Medrano and Gutie´rrez 2001: 754; Westle 2003a: 455; Croucher 2004:
40; Bruter 2005: 1). The conceptualization of collective identity in terms of an emotional compo-
nent of an individual’s self-concept has both pros and cons. The most important benefit is seen
in the possibility to study collective identities at the micro level of societies – that is, the level of
individuals (Westle 2003a: 455; Bruter 2005: 8). This advantage, however, is weakened by two
shortcomings: first, putting the focus on individuals, and second, the overemphasis of feelings. The
latter problem we will discuss in Section 3.1.2.
As for the problem of putting the focus on individuals, we have argued above that not only
individuals but also a group of people can be studied as the subject of collective identities – and
several scholars do so (e.g., Delanty 1995; Habermas 2003; Habermas and Derrida 2003; Huntington
2004; Eder 2009). We can explore this thought by referring to two main ideas of identity that are
prominent in studies on collective identities: first, identity as something a person or group is; and
second, identity as something individuals or collectives have (see Section 3.1). The first idea is
tantamount to a statement of “who I am” or “who we are.” Accordingly, it basically relates to a
definition in terms of describing a self-image or self-concept, a meaning of “me” and “us” (as for
the group level, see Dı´ez Medrano and Gutie´rrez 2001: 754). Thus, identity as “being” helps to
classify things, people or groups of people (Triandafyllidou and Wodak 2003: 206). The second
idea intrinsically refers to a justification. Since “having an identity” relates to “associating oneself
with something or someone else” (Triandafyllidou and Wodak 2003: 206), identity as “having”
always implies more or less unexpressed reasons for a subject’s identification with something.
The distinction of identity as “being” and “having” is strictly different from Kantner’s (2006:
507f) proposal to distinguish between “numerical identification (or categorization)” and “qualita-
tive identity.” According to Kantner (2006: 508), “numerical identification” means that all objects
of the material, social and subjective world can be identified in space and time by a neutral ob-
server. Our proposition takes this for granted and relates both ideas of identity as “being” and
“having” to self-reflections of people or a group of people (see also Stets and Burke 2000: 224).
Due to the two-level nature of collective identities, it certainly makes sense to study both ideas
of identity as “being” and “having” at an individual as well as collective level (see cells A–D in
Figure 1). We simply must be precise about what we are referring to and what we are interested
in whenever we speak of the emergence of a “European identity.”
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 Figure 1: Configuring research foci in studying European collective identity.
On the one hand, we can study the individuals’ self-concept related to a group in that we ask,
for instance, how far the Europeans consider themselves Europeans, which pertains to “who I am”
(see cell A) (e.g., Westle 2003a; McLaren 2006; Bruter 2005; Green 2007; Grundy and Jamieson
2007; Scheuer and Schmitt 2007, 2009; Duchesne 2008; Caporaso and Kim 2009; Fligstein 2009;
Kaina 2009; Thomassen 2009; Risse 2010). But we also can deal with group definition and the
image of the European collective self when asking, for instance, which contents give meaning to
“who we Europeans are” (see cell B) (e.g., Delanty and Rumford 2005; Checkel and Katzenstein
2009; Kaelble 2009). In this context, we can also study the degree of contestation of a “European
identity” since meaning “is the product of social activity, established inter-subjectively and may
always be a matter of agreement or disagreement” (Triandafyllidou and Wodak 2003: 206; Abdelal
et al. see also 2009a: 9).
On the other hand, we can empirically scrutinize the reasons for which EU citizens identify with
the collectivity of EU citizens (see cell C) (e.g., Bruter 2005; Green 2007; Grundy and Jamieson
2007; Kaina 2009, 2010). Furthermore, we can try to find out: (1) what the reasons are for why
“we as Europeans” can be considered a collectivity or a “we” (e.g., Caporaso and Kim 2009;
Scho¨nberger 2009; Thomassen 2009); and (2) how this collective sense of “we-ness” is to be con-
structed (see cell D) (e.g., Cerutti 2008; Kraus 2008; Eder 2009; Karolewski 2010a). In other words,
the individual level of collective identity describes a person’s attribution to a collectivity or a group
(definition) that is regarded as significant and precious for the individual’s self (justification). In
contrast, the group level of collective identity refers to the self-image of a group (definition) and
the reasons for seeing “us” as a collectivity and a “we” (justification). As to the group level,
justification is primarily necessary to act inwardly and outwardly as a collectivity; group definition
is mainly used to present the group both internally and externally as a community. This way,
the group gives its members certain reasons to identify with it and enables others from outside
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the group to recognize it as a collectivity. Collective identities are both internally and externally
defined (Schlesinger 2000: 1875, Herrmann and Brewer 2004: 6) and need the presence of a “sig-
nificant other” (e.g., Tajfel 1982: 104, Wendt 1994: 389, Eisenstadt and Giesen 1995: 47, Delanty
2000: 115, Schlesinger 2000: 1873, Rumelili 2004: 32).
We believe the structure of the cells A–D in Figure 1 is suitable for representing not only
different approaches of political scientists but also various positions of other disciplines in research
on European collective identity, such as the diverse perspectives of sociologists, socio-psychologists,
historians and philosophers. In the following Section 3.1.2, we offer some arguments on the second
issue of analyzing European collective identity.
3.1.2 The need for distinguishing between “belonging to” and “belonging together”
Aside from the two-level nature of collective identities, Bettina Westle (2003b) argued some time
ago that collective identities are based on two distinct kinds of individual–group relationships
(see also Magnette 2007: 668). First, a person’s self-attribution to a collectivity in terms of
someone’s sense of belonging to a group does admittedly need the group’s acknowledgement (Meyer
2004: 22). Therefore, collective identity is based on a vertical relationship between individual and
group (Westle 2003b: 120) resulting from the individual’s experience of belonging by collective
recognition. We relate this vertical type of individual–group relationships to the idea of identity
as “being” and the individual analytical level of collective identity (see cell A in Figure 1).
Second, the process of collective identity formation additionally depends on two crucial pre-
conditions. It presupposes not only the common will of belonging together (Kocka 1995: 29), but
also the group members’ mutual acceptance as associates of one and the same collective (Gellner
1983: 7) and, in this special sense, the mutual acknowledgement as equals (Eisenstadt and Giesen
1995: 74). Consequently, collective identity is also based on horizontal relationships between the
group members (Westle 2003b: 129) in terms of a sense of belonging together. In contrast to the
vertical kind of individual–group relationships, horizontal relations between group members can
apply both at the collective and the individual level of collective identity, as well as to the idea
of identity as “having” (see cells C and D of Figure 1). The first choice is again justified by the
two-level nature of collective identity since a sense of belonging together cannot be seen only as
a feature of a collectivity, but is also one part of an individual’s psychology. The second decision
is based on the above argument: Since “having an identity” relates to “associating oneself with
something or someone else” (Triandafyllidou and Wodak 2003: 206 – emphasis added), identity as
“having” always implies unexpressed reasons for a subject’s identification with something.
These two different modes of individual–group relationships not only serve an analytical purpose
but also pose a methodological challenge. In European identity research, the materialization of a
European collective identity is said to be equivalent to a gradual emergence of a sense of community
among EU citizens. The methodological challenge at hand refers to the following question: is the
people’s sense of belonging to a group – in terms of a vertical relationship between an individual
and a group – really a fair indicator for measuring their sense of community and sense of belonging
together in terms of horizontal relations between group members?
As we have found in the European identity literature, most empirical studies on a mass Eu-
ropean identity start from the theoretical premise that an individual’s collective identity can be
considered as a feeling of belonging to a group (see also Section 3.1.2). A lot of research on
European collective identity therefore provides empirical analyses on how Europeans’ feelings of
attachment to the European Union have been developed over time. Here, we are facing the sec-
ond problem of conceptualizing collective identity (see Section 3.1.1); along with other scholars,
we assume that feelings of belonging to a group cannot emerge before the individual is aware of
her/his group membership and – more importantly – before the group has become relevant for
the person’s self-concept. Social psychologists therefore argue that collective identity is built up
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on the psychological existence of the community (Castano 2004). Referring to the salience of a
collective identity, European identity research still lacks systematic inquiries on how, why and
under what circumstances a collective identity is to be activated (see, however Mols et al. 2009;
Anderson 2010). Consolidated knowledge about those activation mechanisms will be conducive to
empirical research on identity conflicts since “competing or layered identities within collectives can
create opportunities for conflict and fractionalization” (Owens et al. 2010: 494, Hooghe and Marks
2009, Kaina 2009: 64, 72–83). Similarly, Bozˇic´-Vrbancˇic´ et al. (2008: 1018) are critical that the
“question of power is completely ignored” in research on multiple identities in Europe even though
not all identifications are equal.
More than thirty years ago, Henri Tajfel (1974, 1978, 1982) already defined a person’s knowledge
of belonging to a group as one component of group identification (Tajfel 1982: 70, 102). According
to his work, collective identities of individuals contain at least three attitudinal elements: cognitive,
affective and evaluative orientations. With regard to cognitive orientations, social categorization
and attribution serve as benchmarks which display commonalities between “me” and “others” and
designate dissimilarities between “me” and “other others.”
Some sociologists who support a social constructionist view on collective identity challenge this
outlook (Jamieson 2002; Fuss and Grosser 2006), which leads us to the issue of equating “belonging
to” with “belonging together.” These scholars highlight the distinction between processes of cate-
gorizing self and others versus processes of coming to feel a sense of common identity or belonging
together with others (Fuss and Grosser 2006: 213). “Being categorized,” so their argument goes,
“does not automatically mean to take on this label as an aspect of self-identity or to see oneself
as sharing something with others so categorized. If and only if the category has profound con-
sequences in terms of changed patterns of social interactions (does) the assignment to a certain
category become [. . . ] relevant for self-identity” (Fuss and Grosser 2006: 213f – emphasis added;
likewise: Kantner 2006: 507).
This argument allows for two important insights. First, cognitive perceptions in terms of cate-
gorization and attribution are obviously not sufficient in order to conceptualize collective identity.
This general detection, however, does not preclude that cognitive orientations are a necessary
element of the collective identity concept at the individual level. The observation that collec-
tive identities are widely artificial rather than naturally evolved (Cederman 2001a: 141–143) may
underpin this argument.
Some students on nationalism, however, dispute the idea of collective identities in terms of
synthetic constructions. There are two main theories that explain collective identity formation in
nation-states (Cederman 2001a: 141ff; 2001b: 10): essentialism and constructivism. Whereas “es-
sentialists” believe that political collective identities result from the given cultural “raw material”
within a society, “constructivists” stress the active role of intellectuals and political entrepreneurs,
for instance, in manipulating cultural symbols and mobilizing ethnic or cultural cleavages (Ce-
derman 2001a: 142). For the time being, the current position suggests that, compared to the
competing essentialist paradigm, the constructivist school of thought is a length ahead.
In fact, many scholars regard collective identities as social constructions of difference (Giesen
1993) which also rest upon processes of categorization and attribution (Eisenstadt 1999: 373).
The “stuff” of these social constructions may be very different and covers, for instance, norms,
values and symbols (Hettlage 1999: 245f), but also primordial features such as gender or race
(Giesen 1993; Croucher 2004: 39f). As a result of social constructions, frames of assumed or real
characteristics provide distinct patterns of interpretation which, in turn, back up intersubjective
perceptions (Hettlage 1999: 245). The social constructionist argument – and this is the second
insight – nonetheless highlights that we should make an analytical distinction between individuals’
sense of “belonging to” and their sense of “belonging together” since individuals’ attribution to
a group is different from their belief in sharing something with other group members (see also
Figure 1).
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There is also empirical evidence corroborating this line of thought since people may have a sense
of belonging to a group without having a sense of belonging together with other group members. In
their study on European collective identity among young adults, Daniel Fuss and Marita Grosser
(2006: 228) found that some young people considered their sense of belonging to Europe as a con-
sequence of their national citizenship status and origin: being a German is accordingly tantamount
to belonging to the EU and, consequently, being a European, since Germany is a member state
of the European Union. Hence, Fuss and Grosser call this kind of European collective identity
“status identity” since it is only a technical and unemotional statement of “belonging to” without
having any idea of “belonging together” (Fuss and Grosser 2006: 229, 236).
Against this background, another crucial question arises: how do cognitive perceptions of be-
longing mutate into emotional bonds? In other words, what turns people in a group, who are
members of the same social category, into a community? This is a very important question be-
cause community membership has a “higher” quality than merely belonging to a social category.
The specific value of communities results from feelings of mutual commitment between the group
members (Citrin and Sides 2004: 165; likewise: Eder 2009: 430; Risse 2010: 22). Due to these
feelings of commitment, the awareness of “belonging to” becomes identical to the awareness of
“belonging together” which, in turn, provides the background for one’s willingness to show solidar-
ity as well as readiness to make a personal sacrifice for the well-being of the collective and fellow
group members.
Overlooking the research literature, there are several answers to the aforementioned question.
Some scholars stress that people’s awareness of “belonging together” is mainly constructed by elites
and, as such, an artificial artefact (e.g., Giesen 1993; Cederman 2001a). Other students stress that
(horizontal) feelings of togetherness develop inasmuch as people believe that the group is a signif-
icant collective whose state affects the fate of its members and which is valuable enough to give
the group a specific worth (Estel 1997: 79). This argument is based on the plausible supposition
that individuals aspire to such memberships which give some kind of gratification (Tajfel 1982:
103; see also Abdelal et al. 2009a: 4). The Social Identity Theory (SIT), originated by Henri
Tajfel (1974, 1978, 1982), claims, for instance, that both the maintenance and enhancement of
self-esteem is an important motivational underpinning of someone’s identification with a collec-
tivity (Stets and Burke 2000: 232). Collectives or groups become valuable if their insiders share
“precious” commonalities that make a difference to outsiders (Estel 1997: 79f). Large collectives,
however, may become worthwhile for their members only if people can assume that their fellow
group members share those precious commonalities. According to the oft-cited phrase by Benedict
Anderson (1991), large collectives with millions of members are “imagined communities.”
Many other researchers regard human interrelationships and social interactions as the funda-
mental driving force for an emerging sense of belonging together in that they convert cognitive
perceptions into affective bonds (of many: Eisenstadt and Giesen 1995: 74; Giesen 1999: 134; De-
lanty 1999: 269; Eisenstadt 1999: 372f; Schlesinger 2000: 1874; Jamieson 2002; Jones and van der
Bijl 2004: 346f; Mayer and Palmowski 2004: 577; Fuss and Grosser 2006: 212, 215). The group
members’ interrelationships and social interactions transform assumed or real commonalities into
emotionally justified commitments. Taking recourse from these emotive certitudes, the collective
self can experience continuity and develop the collective belief in a common fate (Smith 1992: 58).
But this process depends on two essential conditions: people’s mutual acknowledgment as group
members (Gellner 1983: 7) and the modelling and stereotyping of common characteristics that
make a difference to others (Hettlage 1999: 246). Based on certain “codes of distinctions” (Giesen
1993; Eisenstadt and Giesen 1995: 74), strategies of inclusion and exclusion are used in order to
define a border between inside and outside, in-group and out-group, “us” and “them.”
Decades ago, the Social Identity Theory (SIT) already posited that collective identities require
the definition of both in-group and out-group. Emerging collective identities are traced back
to borderlines inasmuch as the in-group’s features primarily matter in relation to the perceived
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dissimilarity of out-groups (Tajfel 1982: 106). In this respect, collective identities also imply an
evaluative aspect in that they rest on a process of social comparisons. Taking up this point, we
see another void in research on European identity. We call this challenge the border issue. When
it comes to a European collective identity, there is a great empirical void concerning the way of
“othering” and demarcation (see, e.g., Lucarelli 2008; Kaina 2010). Thus, we need more insights
on how social boundaries are created in European collective identity building. Since “boundaries
identify who is and is not a member of a collective” (Owens et al. 2010: 491), we should strengthen
our efforts to learn more about the strategies and practices the group of EU citizens uses to
construct a supranational collective identity (Owens et al. 2010: 491). In particular, we still know
far too little about EU citizens’ psychological processes of delineation against out-groups (see,
however, Rippl et al. 2005; McLaren 2006; Boehnke and Rippl 2007; Kaina 2010). Our knowledge
urgently needs to be extended in this regard since collective identity-building always rests on a
process of social comparison. In order to be effective, at least one contrast group and one relevant
dimension of comparison is needed (Leiße 2009: 127). However, recent empirical evidence suggests
that it is difficult for EU citizens to reach an agreement on what the comparison with “others”
should refer to and who precisely the relevant other, the out-group, is Kaina (2010). Accordingly,
we also need to answer the question of whether the European Union is even capable of developing
a European collective identity. In this context, we might also profit from sociological work which
distinguishes between three types of symbolic boundaries – i.e., moral, socioeconomic and cultural
borders (Lamont 1992, cited by Owens et al. 2010: 491; Bach see also 2010).
Regarding the relationship between in-group and out-group, scholars on collective identities in
general and collective European identity in particular debate the “dark side” of collective identity
formation (e.g., Kohli 2000; Fuchs et al. 1995; Delanty 1995: 149–155; Str˚ath 2002; Eriksen and
Fossum 2004: 443f). The gloomy facet of collective identity is traced back to contestation and even
conflict between in-group and out-group (Delanty 1999: 269; Scheuer 1999: 30). Several scholars
argue that collective identities do not necessarily rest on averseness to others because strangers do
not have to be enemies (Delanty 1995: 5, Delanty 1999: 268, Jamieson see also 2002; Neumann
2001: 143). Nevertheless, the in-group/out-group antagonism is a latent phenomenon which can
be activated under certain circumstances such as the insiders’ perception that outsiders pose a
threat to the in-group (Rippl et al. 2005; McLaren 2006). In this situation, insiders will react
with discrimination against outsiders in order to protect the collective self from perceived or real,
substantial or symbolic “attacks.” Accordingly, political science is facing the challenge of providing
answers to the question of how the strategies of inclusion and exclusion as well as demarcation can
be reconciled with democratic postulates of equality and freedom.
All in all, delimitation and the group’s recognition of individual membership are different sides
of the same coin. Accordingly, it is likely that vertical relationships between individual and group
generally precede the emergence of a horizontal sense of belonging together and are a necessary
piece of a sense of community. However, when something predates another thing, both things
cannot be equal and should be analytically distinguished.
The concept of “belonging to” raises another theoretical problem in empirical, individual-
centered research on European collective identity. That issue is basically caused by scholars’ un-
certainty over what the object of people’s sense of “belonging to” is: Europe, the European Union
or the collective of Europeans? We agree with Sonia Lucarelli (2008: 23) that the very idea of col-
lective identities refers to (a group of) people. Even when we speak about the “identity” of interest
groups, social movements, political parties, business companies or international organizations, we
actually mean a group of people. Accordingly, our conceptualization of collective identity differs
from the proposition by Klaus Eder (2009: 427, 443), who defines collective identities as narrative
constructions which are the objects of identification. Our argument is that the object of collective
identity is always a group of people while there can be a variety of reasons for identification, such
as a common story (e.g., Tilly 2003; Eder 2009; Sassatelli 2010), a set of values and principles (e.g.,
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Cerutti 2008) or similar experiences (e.g., McMillan and Chavis 1986; Kielmansegg 1996). The
point, however, is that scholars’ uncertainty about the object of people’s sense of “belonging to”
brings about another conceptual deficit, namely confusing collective identity with political regime
support. This theoretical weakness is the topic of the next sub-section.
3.1.3 The problem of confusing collective identity with political regime support
Research on people’s attitudes towards politics has exceptionally benefitted from the seminal work
by David Easton (1965, 1979). His concept of political support has inspired generations of scholars
who have empirically scrutinized citizens’ political orientations. Easton’s analytical framework is
based on modes and objects of political support. Without going into greater detail, it is sufficient
to mention diffuse and specific support as modes of political support. As for the objects of political
support, Easton distinguished between political authorities, political regime and political commu-
nity. He theoretically justified these delineations by arguing that there are different consequences
for the long-term endurance of a political system depending on both the modes and objects of
support. Accordingly, diffuse support is far more significant than specific support, and support of
the political community by most community members is the most fundamental precondition for
any political system to sustain. Otherwise, as in the case of civil wars or contested borders, it is
difficult to consolidate a political regime and any form of established governance. Political regime
support, in turn, is more important for a political system in order to persist than citizens’ support
of authorities. While a long-standing decline in regime support will result in regime change, the
general answer to decreasing citizen support for political authorities is replacing these authorities
with other ones. Accordingly, scholars also speak of levels of political support. Whereas citizen
support of the political community is indispensable for a political system to persist, support of
political authorities is not. Regime support, in turn, is on a level in between. In fact, several
scholars who study European collective identity at the individual level lean on Easton since he
described diffuse support of the political community as some sense of community among the com-
munity members (e.g., Weßels 2007; Fuchs et al. 2009c,a; Fuchs 2011a). However, there are also
researchers who confuse European collective identity with EU citizens’ support for the European
Union as a form of governance. One prominent example is the work by Michael Bruter (2003,
2004b, 2005) on the emergence of a mass European identity. He constantly distinguishes two
“components” of a European collective identity among the Europeans (see also Thomassen 2009:
188). The first component he calls “civic identity,” the second one “cultural identity.” Whereas
“cultural identity” refers to citizens’ identification with a human community to which they feel
they belong, “civic identity” relates to citizens’ identification with a political system (Bruter 2004b:
189f, Bruter 2005: 11ff, Bruter 2007: 265, Bruter 2009: 1500). The definition as well as parts of
the operationalization of Bruter’s “civic component” of European collective identity is more akin
to Easton’s political regime support rather than expressing a dimension of Europeans’ sense of
community in terms of a sense of “belonging together.” Thus, it does not come as a surprise that
Bruter frequently finds more evidence for a “civic identity” among the Europeans as opposed to a
“cultural identity” because his “civic component” at least partly measures citizens’ support of the
European political regime (Bruter 2004b, 2005, 2007).
Apart from Bruter’s misleading conceptualization, there are further examples of confounding
collective identity with political regime support in the research on European collective identity.
While Bos (2009: 74) claims that a European sense of community refers to collective identification
with European institutions beyond the national member states, Magnette (2007: 676) argues
that EU citizens’ belief in the cardinal principles of European law and citizens’ acceptance of
the procedures and institutions that create and implement those principles is already a kind of
European identity. Thomas Risse (2010: 26), in turn, further complicates the matter by supposing
that “identities pertaining to territorial entities [. . . ] describe visions of what are regarded as good
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and just political and social orders.” According to Easton, however, such visions of a good and just
political and social order analytically relate to the regime level of political support rather than the
community level. Due to different consequences for the long-term endurance of a political system,
we should generally keep to Easton’s helpful analytical framework.
Summing up the most important arguments of this section, we would like to stress seven
arguments:
1. We apply the notion of “collective identity” to (a group of) people.
2. Collective identity can be seen as a complex phenomenon which comprehends emotional
facets as well as cognitive, evaluative and behavioral aspects.
3. Collective identity can be studied at two different analytical levels by differentiating between
an individual level and a collective or group level. Accordingly, it is necessary to learn more
about how the individual and collective levels of “European identity” are linked to each other
(see, e.g., Dı´ez Medrano 2009). For instance, how does the European Union’s self-image and
group definition affect people’s reasons for their identification with their fellow EU citizens
as well as the EU as a group of Europeans?
4. We distinguish three components of collective identity, namely subject and object of and
reason for identification. Against this background, it is also important to extend our empirical
knowledge about the impacts on the reasons for the EU’s self-representation as a group as
well as the reasons for citizens’ identification with both the EU as a collective and their fellow
European citizens. By doing so, it might be helpful to distinguish between polity, politics
and policy. For example: does the EU’s “democraticness” (polity) affect people’s willingness
to identify with the European Union and its members? Is the increasing politicization of
the European Union (politics) detrimental to the emergence of a shared sense of community
among EU citizens? Do we find systematic evidence that some EU policies have a beneficial
bearing on developing a European collective identity whereas other policies get in the way of
it (see, e.g., Lucarelli 2008)?
5. It might be helpful for further research on “European identity” to change the definition at
the individual level of analysis in that we speak of one’s identification with a group and its
members rather than feelings of belonging. The identification term includes several parts
of individuals’ orientation towards groups and underlines that identities are process-like and
context-dependent (Wendt 1994: 386; Hettlage 1997: 322; Neumann 2001: 144; Rumelili
2004: 32f; Harrie 2006: 78; Vobruba 2007: 79; Duchesne 2008: 163; Lucarelli 2008: 26;
Rutland et al. 2008; Eder 2009: 442; Mols et al. 2009; Cramer 2010: 621).
6. The identification term avoids the common confusion of “belonging to” with “belonging to-
gether.” Since “belonging to” and “belonging together” convey different modes of individual–
group relationships, we should no longer confound them with one another. As a result, a
sense of community among EU citizens should be operationalized by Europeans’ (horizontal)
sense of “belonging together” rather than their (vertical) sense of “belonging to.”
7. We should be skeptical when scholars infer the emergence of a European sense of commu-
nity among EU citizens from the dynamics of political regime support at the supranational
level. Supporting EU membership, for instance, is not equivalent to the Europeans’ sense of
community.
Evidently, many of the characteristics named above go with a multitude of collectives. Research
on collective European identity, however, deals with the emergence of a political collective identity
– that is, a “social identity that (has) political consequences” (Herrmann and Brewer 2004: 6).
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Political collective identities refer to political communities (Bruter 2005: 1) by leading people to
imagine that their group deserves the right of “substantial sovereignty, that is, ultimate decision-
making authority” (Herrmann and Brewer 2004: 6). Even though the relevance of a European
collective identity has become more important as the supranational system of governance has
developed (see Section 1), the problems of defining collective identity commonly hamper systematic
inquiry on this subject. This problem is complicated even further by the difficulties of methods,
operationalization and measurement.
3.2 European identity and the ambiguity of evidence: Challenges of
methods, operationalization and measurement
When it comes to the issue of methods, our updated review of the state of the art on European
identity research is necessarily limited. One the one hand, the severe theoretical problems we
have discussed in the previous sub-section reveal lasting problems in specifying the main concept
of (European) collective identity. For this reason, previous research on European identity lacks
definite analytical instruments for empirically covering and delimiting its main object of study.
Accordingly, empirical studies on European identity are still fragmentary and widely disconnected
from each other. On the other hand, our line of arguments in Section 3.1 is a proposal in character
and has yet to be debated in the scientific community. Thus, our overview on the problems of
methods, operationalization and measurement cannot systematically follow the suggestions of the
previous sub-section. Nevertheless, we will occasionally refer to the arguments of Section 3.1 to
illustrate the tight relationship between the research puzzle and the choice of method, concept
specification and operationalization.
Studies on collective identity in general and European identity in particular vary in how collec-
tive identity is treated as a variable. Thus, collective identity can be empirically analyzed both as
a dependent and an independent variable (Abdelal et al. 2009a: 3, Kaina 2006, 2009). In the first
place, the increased scientific interest in European identity has generated a multitude of publica-
tions that seek to understand and explain the emergence of a collective identity at the European
level. As we have argued above, however, it is not always clear what the subject and object are or
what the reason for an emerging European collective identity is. For further progress in European
identity research, operationalizations should clarify the main concept by taking the three compo-
nents of collective identity into account (see Table 1). In the second place, studies seek to explore
the effect of European identity on other phenomena of interest. For instance, empirical evidence
for the degree and forcefulness of we-identity EU citizens express shall substantiate assumptions on
both the promising chances of and severe obstacles to the endurance of the European integration
project. Other students are interested in the European collective self-image and deal with the
question of whether and, if so, how a “European identity” has a bearing on the EU’s common
foreign policy and the EU’s strategic action within a global security architecture.
3.2.1 Studying European identity as a dependent variable
Research concentrating on European identity as a dependent variable can be arranged in order of
three series of questions.
The first group searches for answers to the classical questions of collective identity formation:
“Who are we?” and “Who does and does not belong to us for what reasons?” Referring to cell
B in Figure 1, those studies mainly deal with “identity as being” at the analytical group level of
collective identity in that they seek to define a European collective self-image and search for answers
to the question of which contents give a meaning to “who we Europeans are” (see Section 3.1.1).
Thus, the first group essentially deals with the possible substance of a common European identity
(e.g., Delanty 1995; Bruter 2004b; Citrin and Sides 2004; Meyer 2004). Some students seek to
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deduce such a substance of a European collective identity from philosophical ideas and normative
principles or from legal documents, whereas other scholars employ discourse analyses or surveys
among elites and non-elites (see Section 3.1.1). However, studies in this field of European identity
research are still piecemeal. They could benefit from a mixed-method-approach by systematically
using and forcefully combining qualitative and quantitative research methods such as cognitive
mapping, quantitative content analysis, surveys, discourse analysis and ethnographical tools (see
also Abdelal et al. 2009a).
The second group of scholars dealing with European identity as a dependent variable is inter-
ested in the prospects of a self-sustaining development of a European sense of togetherness among
EU citizens as well as the obstacles to a shared sense of community at the European level. Explor-
ing (collective) identity as a dependent variable at the individual level is furthermore focused on
the issue if something “is causing a person to adopt a particular identity” (Abdelal et al. 2009a: 3).
Referring to cell A in Figure 1, many scholars in this group explore the EU citizens’ self-concept
related to social groups by dealing with the question of how far the Europeans consider themselves
Europeans (see Section 3.1.1). Other students empirically scrutinize the reasons for which EU
citizens identify with the collectivity of EU citizens and their fellow European citizens. These
researchers are interested in European identity as “having” at the individual level of analysis (see
cell C in Figure 1) and want to learn more about the reasons for the Europeans’ (non-)identification
with the European collectivity and their fellow European citizens (see Section 3.1.1). Notwithstand-
ing the current shortcomings of valid data and suitable gauges (see Section 3.2.2), studies of this
group are methodically dominated by surveys and standardized questionnaires. Recently, however,
there is also a rising interest in applying experimental methods in political science research (e.g.,
McDermott 2002a,b; Morton and Williams 2008, 2010; Faas and Huber 2010). Empirical inquiry
on a mass European identity could benefit from this trend by adding experimental methods to the
classical survey instrument (see also Abdelal et al. 2009a).
The third group of students is mainly interested in two issues circled around cell D in Figure 1:
(1) what the reasons are for why “we as Europeans” can be considered a “we”; and (2) how this
collective sense of “we-ness” is to be constructed (see Section 3.1.1). Again, discourse analysis,
ethnography and content analysis are used to explore these questions empirically. Some scholars
also use quantitative data analysis both at the individual and the aggregate level of analysis in order
to corroborate the reasons of why “we Europeans” can be considered a collectivity. Other students
analyze how European identity is constructed by narratives (e.g., Sassatelli 2010; Eder 2011),
language (e.g., Cramer 2010), value interpretation in the course of policy-making (Lucarelli 2008)
or symbols and foundational myth-making (see Section 4). Those studies on European identity
construction, however, partly merge with an idea of identity as “doing” (see Section 3.1.1).
Although it is hardly possible to look through all the literature available, most studies obviously
vary between doubt and skepticism on the one hand and optimism and confidence on the other.
Whereas some scholars claim there is clear evidence of an emerging European identity among EU
citizens (e.g., Everts and Sinnott 1995; Niedermayer 1995; Scheuer 1999; Schild 2001; Risse 2002,
2004; Citrin and Sides 2004; Bruter 2005; Hurrelmann 2005; Deutsch 2006; Scheuer and Schmitt
2007; Cramer 2010: 620; Fligstein 2010; Fuchs 2011b); other scholars express their doubts by partly
pointing at empirical findings of their own (e.g., Duchesne and Frognier 1995; Meinhof 2004; Kaina
2009) and partly stressing the lack of central preconditions for developing a European collective
identity (e.g., Grimm 1993, 1995; Kielmansegg 1996, 2003; Scharpf 1999; see also Section 2.2).
Regardless of the large number of publications, systematic and longitudinal empirical research
on this topic is still in its infancy. This is true for both qualitative empirical approaches and
quantitative methods. Of course, there is no recipe for examining the impact of several factors
on the forwardness and backwardness of a developing European collective identity in a systematic
manner. The following, however, is an attempt to systematize a number of arguments made by
various scholars.
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The first suggestion is that it can be useful to analytically distinguish between factors referring
to individual and non-individual aspects (see also Figure 2). It is important, however, that these
factors are linked to each other in many ways. The famous macro-micro-macro problem that
highlights the challenge of theory building in the social sciences in general also has to be taken
into account in European identity research. Needless to say, this expectation cannot be met by
a review. Due to the huge theoretical challenge for the scientific community, we present Figure 2
without causal arrows. The dotted line between individual and non-individual aspects, however,
symbolizes the context-dependency of individuals’ predispositions. In quantitative research on
political attitudes and behavior, it is now common to use multi-level analyses to model the impact
of the social context on the individuals’ attitudes and political behavior (recently, e.g., Van Deth
and Tausendpfund 2013).
Accordingly, non-individual aspects can be seen as a class of exogenous contextual factors
and endogenous opportunity structures which influence the manifestation of a European collective
identity. The former refers to events or circumstances which originate outside the community’s
borders and threaten the collective fate. This idea is derived from some researchers’ proposition
that the citizens’ sociotropic perceptions of an external threat as well as the collective experience
of danger from outside – for instance, in the case of war, terrorism, environmental catastrophes or
growing social and economic encumbrances due to increasing competition pressure from outside
– may strengthen the group members’ sense of community (Simmel 1955, Huntington 2004: 24,
Fo¨rster 2007: 149).
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Figure 2: Systematizing possible influences on developing a European collective identity
Endogenous opportunity structures could be based on cultural, institutional or process-related
features. It is impossible to completely list all the relevant factors in this context. Instead, some
examples shall illustrate the attempt to structure some of those aspects. The cultural sub-division
encompasses, for instance, the existence or absence of common values, norms and principles as
well as common symbols, traditions and memories. Aside from these factors, the availability of
a convincing communal or integration ideology may also play an important role in promoting a
shared sense of community (e.g., Easton 1979: 332; Westle 1999: 22, 95; referring to a “founding
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myth”: Grimm 2004: 455ff). In this context, Bozˇic´-Vrbancˇic´ et al. (2008: 1016f) deplore the
EU’s “inability to make affective appeal to its citizens (and) construct affective libidinal bonds.”
The institutional branch can be taken literally: it refers to the existence and normative quality
of the political infrastructure at the European level, its effectiveness and performance. This set
of factors comprises not only supranational institutions of governance but also the development of
an intermediary system at the European level, including a European party system and European
interest organizations (e.g., Leinen and Scho¨nlau 2003; Hix 2005: 186–192, 208–231; Immerfall
2006: 77–94).
Finally, we have to admit that within the proposed structure, the process-related section is still
the most blurred one. This branch of factors influencing the conditions for developing a European
collective identity and a shared sense of community might contain, for instance, the extent and
development of a European public (e.g., Eder et al. 1998; Eder and Kantner 2000; Eder 2003; Klein
et al. 2003; de Vreese 2007 – see also Section 2.3.1). Moreover, the process of an increasing similarity
between the EU member states with regard to prosperity, welfare and economic growth could be an
aspect of this group of impact factors. This idea is underpinned by the assumption of psychologists
that status differences between group members impede the process of homogenization inside the
group because this kind of discrepancy cements discrimination in terms of stereotypes or prejudices
(Fo¨rster 2007: 149, 248). Conversely, it can be assumed that decreasing heterogeneity not only
weakens the opinion that “the others” are different from “us,” but also fosters the perception of
commonalities (Wendt 1994: 390). Furthermore, the process-related cluster of possible influences
on the emergence of a common European identity points out that collective identities in large-scale
communities are artificially generated constructs. That is, a common sense of community will be
shaped by discourses (e.g., Str˚ath 2002; Suszycki 2006) inasmuch as collective identities among
strangers refer to “imagined communities” (Anderson 1991).
The other side of the coin indicates certain predispositions of individuals. Many scholars empha-
size that experiences play a crucial role in developing we-feelings and a shared sense of community
(e.g., Haller 1999: 269; Bruter 2004b: 208; Fuss, Garc´ıa-Albacete, and Rodriguez-Monter 2004:
280f; Herrmann and Brewer 2004: 14). This could not only be real experiences, such as meeting
other people, but also so-called parasocial “encounters” via internet, TV, radio, magazines and
newspapers (Fo¨rster 2007: 247). However, it is mainly an open question of what kind of expe-
rience has a greater influence on the materialization of collective identities. For instance, which
are more significant: experiences with insiders or with outsiders? Do positive experiences affect
we-feelings to a higher degree than negative ones? And what do these experiences refer to: other
people, institutions, elites or certain outputs of the political process?
The latter question in particular leads up to the attitudinal cluster that may influence the
degree of a shared sense of European community at the individual level. In this case, the conceptual
challenge is to distinguish such variables from those which will serve as indicators for the theoretical
construct of a common sense of European community as an independent variable (see Section 3.2.2).
What we have in mind here are ideological belief systems and value orientations but also already
existent collective identities. In particular, the questions of whether people hold an exclusive or
inclusive national identity and how existent national identities relate to an emerging supranational
European collective identity are among the most debated issues of European identity research at the
individual analytical level (e.g., Dı´ez Medrano and Gutie´rrez 2001; Carey 2002; Risse 2002, 2004;
Westle 2003a,b; Deutsch 2006: 165–171; Bruter 2005: 15–19; 114–118; Duchesne and Frognier
2008; Caporaso and Kim 2009; Hooghe and Marks 2009: 13; Fuchs 2011b: 61–63). Furthermore,
such citizens’ attitudes could be interesting as a mirror, for instance, for low self-esteem and
authoritarian, rigid and xenophobic orientations as opposed to high self-esteem, open-mindedness
and tolerance.
Finally, it can be plausibly assumed that people’s individual resources – for instance in terms
of education, command of language or social capital – may form either favourable or unfavourable
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conditions for European identity formation (e.g., Fuss, Garc´ıa-Albacete, and Rodriguez-Monter
2004; Fuss and Grosser 2006; Weßels 2007; Fligstein 2010).
3.2.2 Studying European identity as an independent variable
Studying identity as an independent variable is concerned with its impact on something else, such as
a collective’s capability of group integration and collective action or the group members’ readiness
to accept binding decisions by which they are affected. Looking at the possibilities of studying
European identity as an independent variable, there are already several studies focusing on the
individual analytical level of collective identity (e.g., Citrin and Sides 2004; Mau 2005; Weßels
2007; Kaina 2009; Fuchs 2011b). These approaches are interested in the effects of a European
identity, for instance, on citizen support of the integration process and the European Union. As
for individuals, research on identity as an independent variable furthermore asks if “identity is
causing a person to do a particular thing” (Abdelal et al. 2009a: 3).
In the following, we will focus on three aspects. First, we concentrate on the individual level
in analyzing European identity. Second, we apply our ideas about measuring European identity
to EU citizens’ sense of belonging together and their sense of community, respectively (see also
Section 3.1.2). Third, we refer to surveys as one promising method for empirically analyzing a
shared sense of belonging together among EU citizens. Some researchers criticize the dominance of
surveys in studying European identity and argue for more qualitative methods (e.g., Cerutti 2008:
9f). Referring to our proposal for systematizing different angles of European identity research (see
Figure 1), we argue for a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods which rather complement
than preclude each other (see also Abdelal et al. 2009a). For the following proposition, however,
we focus on a quantitative approach.
Based on the supposition that a collective identity refers to affective attitudes of people, stan-
dardized questionnaires frequently contain questions which emphasize feelings of attachment in
order to operationalize a common sense of community among Europeans. Apart from our theoret-
ical critique presented above (see Section 3.1.2), answers to such general questions do not reveal
much information about the degree or the sturdiness of a sense of belonging together among Eu-
ropeans. The strength of any we-identity in terms of group members’ sense of community has to
be proven in case of conflicts, danger and threat.
On the whole, the current development in quantitative empirical research on a common sense
of belonging together among EU citizens is still unsatisfying due to a shortage of standardized,
longitudinal, reliable and valid data as well as suitable methods of measurement (e.g., Risse 2002;
2004: 253; Bruter 2004b: 187; Sinnott 2006; Kaina 2009). This situation is probably the main
reason for both inconsistent evidence on the state of collective identity at the European level and
conflicting assessments of its development. One cause of this unsatisfactory situation can be found
in the limitations of broad surveys on a vast multitude of issues. The design of questionnaires
normally results in a trade-off between efficiency regarding time, money and the amount of ques-
tions on the one hand, and the researchers’ quest for profundity and complexity on the other. As
a consequence of compromises detrimental to the latter goal, wide-ranging surveys often neglect
the abstract nature of concepts in social research. Theoretical constructs like “collective identity,”
“sense of community” or “sense of belonging together” are abstractions of social reality and can-
not be observed in a direct way. Thus, such concepts not only need a definition but also require
reference to noticeable variables by defining appropriate indicators (see Figure 3).
As for the definition, we use people’s “sense of belonging together” synonymously to their “sense
of community.” We are aware that this is a simplification which needs more elaboration in further
research. Defining “sense of community,” we refer to a proposal by psychologists. Accordingly,
“sense of community is a feeling that members have of belonging, a feeling that members
matter to one another and to the group, and a shared faith that members’ needs will be
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met through their commitment to be together” (McMillan 1976; quoted in McMillan
and Chavis 1986: 9).
Drawing on our theoretical premises, we modify this definition in two aspects. On the one hand,
we do not confine someone’s “sense of community” to emotions (see also Section 3.1.2). On the
other hand, we conceptualize someone’s “sense of belonging together with others” as an orientation
defined “as anything people have in mind with respect to a specific object” (Niedermayer andWestle
1995: 44). The “specific object” in our context is the European political community. Furthermore,
our suggestion is mainly based on three points of view.
First, based on literature on national collective identities, we suggest that the quantitative em-
pirical inquiry of citizens’ orientations regarding the development and extent of a shared sense of
community among Europeans can also provide knowledge about the intensity of those sentiments
and the levels of identification with the European community in terms of EU citizens’ sense of
belonging together (Westle 1999: 102f; Huntington 2004: 49). If one agrees that ‘the development
of orientations begins with [. . . ] awareness [. . . ] and ends with behavioural intentions [. . . ]’ (Nie-
dermayer and Westle 1995: 44), the phenomenon of any collective identity cannot be limited to
affection, sympathy, pride or other affective modes of orientation. Rather, it seems that feelings
express an advanced stage of identity and that they are probably not a sufficient condition, but in
many situations they are a necessary condition for behavioural consequences.
Second, we accordingly assume that different modes of citizen orientations are relevant to the
study of a shared sense of community among Europeans (see Figure 3). Therefore, cognitive
orientations – such as knowledge, interest and salience – should be the basic attitudes (see also
Estel 1997: 79; Fuss and Grosser 2006). As we have argued in Section 3.1, we have to form a
picture of ‘us’ as well as to recognize that the specific ‘we’ is actually a significant category of
self-identification, before we can develop any we-feelings.
However, it is doubtful that cognitive orientations are automatically transformed into behavioral
intentions (although Tajfel 1982 argues otherwise). As a rule, cognitions need some permanence
to evolve into habits that produce familiarity which, in turn, encourages social action. Moreover,
before cognitive orientations become relevant for individual behavior, they are generally influenced
by the affective as well as the evaluative orientations of the individuals. Hence, we suppose that
both behavioral intentions and concrete observable behaviour are the highest levels of identification.
This proposition is based on the argument that evaluations and feelings have to prove themselves
in certain situations of conflict, disagreement and danger – in other words, every time the readiness
to pay a price on behalf of the community is needed. Since the proposed framework is focused on
orientations, real individual behaviour is left outside this conceptualization.
Third, the most general examples of operationalization shown in Figure 3 are also theoretical
constructs and require indicators as well. In this regard, further empirical inquiry into a shared
sense of community among Europeans may profit from research on the so-called “inner unity” of
East and West Germans in the unified Germany. Just two examples may illustrate the argument.
Are people ready to give up some of their cake by making personal sacrifices? The “willingness
of individuals to give up things they value for the sake of the collectivity and the acceptance
of re-distributive policies” (Zu¨rn 2000: 199) is the decisive question of acting in solidarity with
others. Accordingly, people’s intention to show solidarity throughout Europe could be measured,
for example, by their willingness to accept a tax increase in order to financially support their
poorer neighbors. Mutual sympathy could be measured by certain statements – standardized or
open questioned – which reproduce distinctive images and reciprocal stereotypes. At the same
time, such findings may produce knowledge about the criteria of inclusion and exclusion. These
results will also give some information about the reasons for coming closer together as well as the
causes for the maintenance of barriers.
The proposal shown in Figure 3 brings about an important insight for measuring European
identity in terms of a shared sense of European community. Dealing with Europeans’ sense of be-
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Figure 3: Systematizing citizens’ orientations regarding a common European identity
longing together as a variable, we should treat it as a construct of several components or elements
(see also McMillan and Chavis 1986: 9) comparable, for instance, to the construct of the Authori-
tarian Personality (Adorno et al. 1950). From this, two consequences for designing such a variable
appear. First, we have to think about what these elements could be. One possibility for specifying
those elements might be to refer to the modes of individuals’ orientations – i.e., cognitions (1),
feelings and evaluations (2) and behavioral intentions (3). The second consequence deals with
the challenge to theoretically justify those elements and relate them to suitable operationalization
procedures.
In the end, we must also clarify what kind of community we have in mind when it comes to
the European Union. Referring to a distinction by Gusfield (1975), there are “two major uses of
the term community” (McMillan and Chavis 1986: 8): The first usage relates to a territorial and
geographical idea of community such as neighborhoods, cities and states; the second use refers to
a relational notion regarding the “quality of character of human relationships without reference
to location” (Gusfield 1975: xvi) and developed around interest and skills such as professional
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or spiritual communities. As a first hypothesis, we assume we need both uses of community in
studying a European sense of community. The territorial notion of community is needed inasmuch
as the European Union has established a Weberian Herrschaftsverband at the European level (see
Section 1). Thereby, territorial borders mark the geographical scope of political rule and define
who is not only subject to certain obligations but also entitled to exclusive rights as a member
of the political community. The relational notion of (European) community becomes relevant
when EU citizens develop a shared sense of community on the basis of common values, beliefs and
interests that bind people together without and beyond territorially defined membership. Against
this background, it might be promising to analyze whether and, if so, how both kinds of European
communities are related. However, these considerations need both more theoretical elaboration
and empirical clarification in future research.
4 Identity technologies of the European Union
In addition to the theoretical double perspective on collective European identity as both a de-
pendent and independent variable, there is growing research on the identity technologies of the
European identity, which pertains to methods of identity construction by political authorities.
In tune with the constructivist paradigm of collective identity (see Section 3.1), the EU is
believed to apply identity technologies towards its citizens in an attempt to construct collective
identity. These identity technologies aim for collective identity in a top-down manner as citizens
become receivers of a collective identity whose orientation is constructed by the political authorities.
The EU attempts therefore to generate a sense of belonging among citizens in a non-nation-state
polity. In order to generate collective identity, the EU reverts to various identity technologies
including the manipulation of symbols, foundational myth-making, the promotion of positive self-
images and transfer of identity. However, different perspectives exist on the effectiveness of the
EU’s identity technologies and differing academic proposals have been made regarding the identity
technologies that the EU should use. Nonetheless, there is one common ground for these proposals:
the EU should apply its identity technologies in a more subtle manner than the EU member states
can by reverting to traditional forms of nationalism. Therefore, the identity construction is likely
to occur in the light version as the EU cannot (and should not) exactly emulate the nationalism
of the nation-states regarding its strength, sacrificial appeal and aggressiveness (Karolewski 2007:
9–32; Karolewski 2010b).
4.1 Manipulation of symbols
It is believed that the EU practises manipulation of cultural symbols pertaining to collective
identity. One example of this is the introduction of the common currency in the EU (Hymans 2004:
5–31). The establishment of the tangible symbol of the euro and its iconography is expected to
raise the salience of “Europeanness” without the necessity of homogenizing the European cultural
diversity, since the euro allows for different iconographic connotations. At the same time, a common
currency establishes a certain degree of commonality and therefore fosters new identity content
(Risse et al. 1999: 147–187). Thomas Risse (2003: 487–505) stresses the significance of the euro for
the development of the collective identity in the European Union. He argues that the introduction
of the euro has had a substantial impact on the citizens’ identification with the EU and Europe,
as the common currency enhances the realness of Europe by providing a tangible link from the
European level to the daily lives of the citizens (see also Cerulo 1995). The recent research on the
symbols of collective identity also highlights their importance for the EU (Manners 2011). The
role of iconographic symbols and quasi-national rituals appears to be particularly promising for
the generation of European identity as they are likely to transcend linguistic boundaries, mainly
due to of their non-oral content.
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Furthermore, Michael Bruter (2003, 2004a) examines separate symbols and items pertaining
to collective images and identity in Europe. According to his analysis of focus-group discussions
in France, UK and the Netherlands, he argues that the majority of the participants’ perceptions
of Europe and their self-assessment of their European identity referred predominantly to civic
images, whereas a minority perceived the EU in cultural terms. The images of cultural Europe
by the participants were associated with peace, harmony, the disappearing of historical divisions
and cooperation between similar people. In contrast, the images of civic Europe were linked to
borderlessness, circulation of citizens, and prosperity (Bruter 2003: 1148–1179; Bruter 2004a: 21–
39). In his further study, Bruter (2005) confirms his preliminary conclusions about civic and
cultural images with regard to certain symbols. He highlights that the EU imitates nation-states
by delivering proper national symbols in order to stimulate a European political community. These
include not only euro notes and coins, but also a flag, an anthem, a national day, and until recently,
an attempt to introduce a constitution. In other words, the EU manipulates cultural and political
symbols to construct European mass identity by mimicking technologies of national identity.
Further cases of manipulation of cultural symbols pertain, for instance, to the EU’s cultural
policy. This encompasses symbolic initiatives such as the European Cities of Culture, with the goal
of raising the visibility and identifiability of the EU. The European Union increasingly promotes
commonality symbols while attempting to respect the realm of national cultures (Sassatelli 2002:
435–451). Thus, the EU tries to enhance its salience via symbolic diffusion into the everyday life
of citizens, but without relinquishing the symbolic ambiguity. However, it is argued that in the
case of the EU, ambiguity does not necessarily mean confusion, but rather is to be viewed as a
response to the European cultural diversity (Sassatelli 2002: 446).
Moreover, one could argue that attempts to personify the European Union, for instance through
the establishment of an office of the foreign minister or president, point in the same direction as the
manipulation of symbols. Personification techniques are frequently used by the nation-state elites to
stimulate collective identity. Since nation-states or political systems in general are abstract entities,
they necessitate a more concrete embodiment for the mass population to conceive of them and to
develop shared identity with reference to them. This embodiment can occur as personification
in which the state, or in our case the European Union as a polity, becomes associated with the
most salient figure in the political system. Recent studies in political psychology confirm the
hypothesis that personification of political systems facilitates ‘stronger’ attitudes and hence may
be decisive in the formation of collective identities. As opposed to personification, embodying the
political system as a parliamentary institution is likely to produce weaker attitudes, which leads
to the conclusion that a widespread practice of personification of the political system has robust
and potentially far-reaching attitudinal consequences (McGraw and Dolan 2007: 299–327). For
the European Union, it could mean that the proposals made in the Draft Constitutional Treaty
implying personification techniques would be more effective in terms of collective identity than
public visibility of the European Parliament.
At this point, we should address the tension between the manipulation of symbols by European
authorities and EU governance. By manipulating symbols, the EU establishes an order-creating
cultural system as a conveyor of identity, but not as a basis for popular sovereignty. Therefore,
manipulation of cultural symbols reflects the identity technology used by the nation-states, which
socialize the nation into bearers of loyalty towards the state. This is related to the no-demos
problem of the EU (see Section 2.2), since the EU is not a state and there is no European de-
mos in sight. Consequently, the identity construction qua manipulation of symbols might not be
easily discernible from collective brainwashing, which contradicts the very notion of democratic
citizenship. This collectivistic stimulation of citizens’ identity responding to cultural manipulation
exhibits a predilection for authoritarian politics, since it enhances the inequality between the rulers
and the ruled, and thus increases the democratic deficit of the EU (Karolewski 2010a).
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4.2 Foundational myth-making
Beyond research on symbols we can observe a shift of focus towards foundational mythology in the
European Union. The foundational myth-making in the EU concentrates on narratives creating
normative and cognitive foundations for the EU governance, thus laying ground for European
identity. The constitutive myths or mythomoteurs have thus far been explored mainly in the
nationalism research (Smith 1987: 87), where one of the most relevant aspects of nationalism is a
generation or strengthening of national identity via foundational myth-making. In the context of
the EU, one of such mythomoteurs is the narrative of how the integration process was responsible for
peace, prosperity and democracy in Europe. According to Vincent Della Sala (2010), this narrative
went through all stages of successful national mythologizing: diffusion, ritual and sacralization.
Della Sala argues that this foundational myth has become entrenched in the political discourse
of European integration and is mainly activated before important decisions that involve citizens,
such as the national referenda on EU issues (for instance in France, the Netherlands and Ireland)
or the EU’s struggle to establish new institutions dealing with recent debt crisis (Della Sala 2010:
11). At the same time, it can be pointed out that the foundational myth of the European Union
as a vehicle for peace, stability and economic growth is apparently losing its appeal, particularly
among younger generations of Europeans. As a consequence, the EU has been at pains to establish
new mythomoteurs which would, for instance, cajole the participants of referenda into accepting
European projects such as the Constitutional Treaty. One such a myth relates to fundamental
rights as inherent to the European project and based on a common European heritage, even
though fundamental rights were not part of the initial project of European integration. As Stijn
Simismans (2010: 62) argues, the narrative of the EU as a guardian of fundamental rights from
its very inception results from the EU’s appropriation of the fundamental rights credentials of its
member states and the Council of Europe. Although fundamental rights were not in the Rome
Treaty, the EU has gradually generated this myth, which is believed and acted upon by both
institutional myth-makers and civil society actors. It faced its particular activation during the
debates on the Charter of Fundamental Rights and is about to reach the sacralization phase.
The foundational myths are different from other political myths which have much more in
common with positive self-images (see Section 4.3). The foundational myths construct the glorious
past of a polity and appeal to new generations that cannot remember the origins of the polity in
question. In other words, foundational myths attempt to forge collective identity among citizens
through creating a feeling of continuity between older and newer generations. One might even
argue that the appeal of foundational myths aims for temporarily re-establishing a permissive
consensus in times when it is needed, for instance before referenda.
4.3 Positive self-images of the EU
In addition to the manipulation of symbols, the European Union engages in the promotion of
positive self-images, which finds resonance in the academic debates on the possible content of the
EU’s collective identity. Three main types of self-images promoted by the EU can be discerned:
the image of cosmopolitan Europe, civilian power and normative power.
The first type of positive self-image refers to the EU’s substantive identity as cosmopolitan
Europe. One of the most known and fervent proponents of cosmopolitan Europe is Ju¨rgen Haber-
mas, who believes that the European Union can be based on a thin collective identity stemming
from a set of abstract universalistic principles such as human rights, but evolves and thickens
from this Kantian cosmopolitan conception into the European constitutional patriotism which is
expected to replace the ethnic bonds of European nations (Habermas 2003: 86–100; Stevenson
2006: 485–500). Since the EU represents a post-national constellation, European citizens, induced
by the process of European constitution-making or constitutionalization, are likely to develop a
sense of loyalty and solidarity among strangers with regard to each other by abstracting from their
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particular identities. This cosmopolitan Europe is also associated with a constitution rather than
a state and is anchored in a shared culture of universal and liberal values (Shabani 2006: 699–718;
Lacroix 2002: 944–958; Cronin 2003: 1–28; Rile Hayward 2007: 182–196. Simultaneously, the
cosmopolitan image of Europe shows normative boundaries, which distinguishes Europe from, for
instance, the USA. Habermas (2003: 291–297) regards the historical and institutional peculiari-
ties of Europe (such as secularization, the priority of the state over the market, the primacy of
social solidarity over achievement, skepticism concerning technology, awareness of the paradoxes
of progress, rejection of the law of the stronger, and the commitment to peace as a consequence of
the historical experience of loss) as an appropriate boundary mechanism.
Beyond the differences to the USA, the cosmopolitan image of the EU is expected to rest on
the EU’s transformed concept of power politics, according to which the EU exports the rule of law,
democracy and human rights worldwide. Erik Oddvar Eriksen (2006: 252–269) argues that the
criteria for the EU’s missionary activities can be derived from cosmopolitanism, suggesting that the
EU subordinates its external policies to the constraints of a higher ranking law. In this perspective,
the EU is regarded as different from the interest-maximizing actors in international politics as it
is able to act out of a sense of justice or duty pertaining mainly to human rights. Consequently,
infringements of human rights become sanctioned, whereby the EU increasingly fulfills the role of
the forerunner of the new international order. However, this self-image of the EU is not entirely
mirrored in the reality. Eriksen points out that while inconsistent human rights policies within the
EU and moral double standards are not exceptions, the EU can be deemed the most promising
role model for other actors in its cosmopolitan zeal to anchor human rights in international politics
(see also Lavenex 2001: 851–874). Not only does the EU project its cosmopolitan image outside,
but it also attempts to enhance the positive image consistency between the externally projected
and the internally applied standards. The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights is believed to be
the indicator for these attempts.
A further positive image of the EU discussed in the debate pertains to the notion of the EU
as a civilian power. This issue has aroused considerable interest in recent years, since it seemingly
gives the EU an additional feature with which to distinguish itself from other global powers such
as the USA. The notion of civilian power refers to the methods of international politics rather
than the substance (Orbie 2006: 123–128). The EU is believed to pursue post-national or ethical
interests by using methods of normative change rather than the use of force. The civilian power
Europe would act primarily in accordance with ideas and values, not military or economic strength.
In this sense, the EU’s actions are believed to be more civilizing, which echoes the debate on
the EU as a post-Westphalian political system (Sjursen 2006: 169–181). One of the tenets of
civilian power Europe is believed to be multiculturalism, which is a form of self-binding by law.
Seen from this angle, the EU’s objective is not to maximize its selfish interests, but to promote
the development of an international society according to the rule-based international order of
multilateral institutionalism. The EU therefore fosters the power of international institutions and
regional organizations, which allows for an extensive coordination and cooperation of actors in
international politics (Youngs 2004: 415–435). The goal is the creation of institutionalized and
global governance capable of solving global and regional collective problems. Consequently, the
principles of conduct are of major interest for the civilian power Europe. The civilian nature of the
EU is likely to be demonstrated particularly in the context of the EU foreign policy cooperation,
which is believed to maintain a non-colonial civilizing identity towards its neighbors. As opposed
to the US, EU member states are believed to revert to deliberative cooperation mechanisms among
themselves. Consequently, even in an uncertain political environment, member states are likely to
remain attached to deliberation and cooperation, which is an indicator of a basic trust between
the member states (Mitzen 2006: 270–285). In this sense, trust among nations is expected to play
an important role in the European identity, as opposed to the anarchy of brute power outside the
European Union.
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The third image of European identity is the EU as a normative power, which is directly linked to
the cosmopolitan and civilizing image. Here, the EU stresses its progressive stance in rejecting the
death sentence or in promoting and implementing environmental policies, for instance. By so doing
it asserts its leading role and depicts the US, for instance, as a laggard. In other words, the EU
promotes its positive image as the forerunner in the fight against climate change, thus claiming its
moral supremacy. Consequently, the EU uses the vanguard-laggard dichotomy in order to describe
its own identity in contrast to other countries, in particular the US. The United States is especially
useful for the EU’s identity constructing processes; since it is a global power with its own normative
appeal, it can serve as a “significant other.” In this case, the EU uses techniques associated with
the construction of the inferiority of the other with the aim of establishing and perpetuating its own
positive image. The normative power image referring to environmental diplomacy and bio-safety
regulations is regarded as a reflection of distinctive societal values of European societies. Therefore,
the green normative power defines itself through the difference mainly to the US, which becomes
a constitutive factor pertaining to shared European identity (Falkner 2007: 507–526). However,
this image of green normative power is empirically inconsistent. Robert Falkner (2007: 521)
argues that the EU’s distinctive stance in environmental politics was not simply the outgrowth of
a deep-rooted normative orientation but frequently the result of domestic conflicts over the future
of biotechnology. In the debate over genetically modified foods, the EU offered international
leadership only after strong anti-GM sentiments appeared among the public. Prior to this, the EU
attached little importance to the bio-safety talks. However, even after the EU claimed international
leadership in that field, it sought to export its own domestic regulatory model which would ensure
that international rules would not damage the EU’s economic interests in medical biotechnology
(see also Lenschow and Sprungk 2010).
On the one hand, the positive self-images generated by the EU exhibit cracks in consistency
which may inhibit their socializing capacity. On the other hand, the self-images can be regarded
as propaganda instruments with the goal of manipulating the EU population, as they are not
entirely mirrored in the social reality and espouse double standards. This can have negative
implications for the legitimacy of EU governance, exacerbating the gulf between the manipulative
elites and the EU population. In addition, it remains controversial whether the EU is capable of
generating constitutional patriotism based on a thin identity. The troubles with the ratification of
the Constitutional Treaty in its various versions point to the effects of constitutionalization that
are contrary to what the advocates of constitutional patriotism expected.
Recent research on positive self-images of the EU not only stresses occasional cracks in the nor-
mative credibility of such self-images, but rather highlights that there might be a more systematic
problem of normative reliability of the EU’s positive self-images. For instance, all the self-images
of the EU as cosmopolitan, civilian, normative power share a positive view of the EU as a foreign
policy actor guided by the common good and reluctant to use military power (cf. Pacheco Pardo
2012). Ramon Pacheco Pardo (2012: 15) argues, however, that these images do not accurately
depict the real nature of the foreign behavior of the EU. In contrast to the positive self-images,
the EU seeks to defend its own security without much consideration for the means involved. In
particular, the EU did not hesitate to resort to military means in the case of proliferation of WMD.
Especially following terrorist attacks in New York, Madrid and London, the EU has developed an
increased readiness to flex its military muscle. This trend is likely to further enhance since the
Treaty of Lisbon calls for an increase in the military capabilities of the EU within the European
Security and Defense Policy and an increase of the operational force capable of acting beyond the
EU’s borders. In this sense, the EU appears as a normal power rather than a cosmopolitan, civilian
or normative power, and thus loses its exceptionality.
This is even more evident in the case of the EU arms trade policy, as countries with poor human
rights records are still frequent receivers of European weapons and military technology (Erickson
2011). Therefore, both human rights concerns and pressures to export influence the EU’s foreign
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policy, as opposed to a predominance of normative aspects suggested by the normative power
image. As a consequence, conflicts of material and normative interests are the rule rather than the
exception in EU foreign behavior. In this context, Erickson (2011: 12) points to a low level of EU
socialization concerning arms deals which stand in the way of the creation of a single European
external identity. A particularly instructive case is the China weapons embargo debate, where
pressures on lifting the embargo have considerably risen since China has become a willing supporter
in the European sovereign debt crises under the condition of ending the embargo. Here, ongoing
conflicts between leading EU member states (France and Germany) illustrate the difficulty of
upholding a consistently normative position within the EU. These findings are particularly striking
when compared to the EU’s official discourse on European security where the cosmopolitan, civilian
and normative images are not only pervasive but also closely connected to the EU’s role claims in
the international relations (cf. Ferreira Nunes 2011).
In addition, the discrepancy between the positive self-image of the EU and its policies has been
increasingly criticized in the scholarship on the EU’s role in the field of international criminal jus-
tice. For instance, the EU member states have committed themselves to the fight against impunity
for serious international crimes including genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and tor-
ture. However, the record of the EU member states is ambiguous, as support for the investigations
of the International Criminal Court (ICC) is uneven and the member states are often reluctant to
develop binding common policies in this area (Aoun 2012). Even though the EU regards itself as
the unconditional supporter of the ICC, the member states are not straightforwardly committed
to bringing the perpetrators of serious international crimes to justice. On the one hand, the EU
and its member states show a strong interest in international justice and present themselves as
forerunners of the so-called universal justice. On the other hand, the EU is reluctant to accept the
fight against impunity as dominant norm of international criminal justice (Aoun 2012: 34). For
instance, some EU member states have proven reluctant to support the ICC in its investigations,
thus allowing many perpetrators of serious crimes to enjoy safe havens within their borders. In
contrast to the EU’s positive self-image, they did not offer full political support to the inquiries
of the ICC and the implementation of arrest warrants. In the case of Darfur, the EU has even
encouraged negotiations with warlords targeted by an ICC arrest warrant and failed to make strong
statements supporting the ICC Prosecutor. Elena Aoun argues in her study that criticism is par-
ticularly strong with regard to the leniency of the Europeans in their dealings with the Sudanese
President Al-Bashir. When the ICC prosecutor applied for an arrest warrant against President
Al-Bashir in 2008, the EU Presidency (held by France) not only hinted at the possibility of the
suspension of the indictment in exchange for ending the killings in Darfur, but after the arrest
warrant was issued, the EU Presidency even advocated a “balance between peace and justice”
(Aoun 2012: 26).
These findings might point to systematic discrepancies between the official EU discourse and
the EU policies, rather than mere cracks in normative consistency. It shows that processes of
socialization towards common normative positions among the EU member states are not self-
evident, as the positive self-images suggest. As a consequence, the self-images might have a limited
potential as technologies of collective identity.
4.4 Transfer of identity
The positive self-images do not only have relevance for internal discourse on European identity, as
the EU also projects its vision of European identity beyond its own borders. In particular, the EU
promotes its identity in the so-called European neighborhood (ENP), both within the Southern or
the Eastern dimension of the ENP. It relates mainly to the external democratization dimension of
the EU, which focuses on democracy promotion in third countries through the support for human
rights, good governance standards and modernization projects. The EU’s external actions and
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programs can also be interpreted as the EU’s quest to legitimize its own policies by shaping rules,
norms and institutions in third countries in accordance with the EU standards; that is, with the
EU’s institutional identity embodied by the acquis communautaire. In this sense, the transfer of
the EU’s institutional identity can be viewed as a reflexive strategy related to the construction of
the EU’s own collective identity (Karolewski 2011). The research on codes of collective identity
(Eisenstadt and Giesen 1995; Eisenstadt 1999; Giesen 1999) suggests that communities transferring
domestic institutions to non-members can strengthen their own weak collective identity. This
applies mainly to communities regarding the Others as potential members and attempting to
include them by using persuasion and conversion strategies (cf. Morozov and Rumelili 2012). As
the non-members are considered inferior as long as they are not converted, the strength of this type
of collective identity is partially dependent on crossing the boundary and transferring the collective
identity to others outside the collectivity. Thus, the missionary strategies of the community act as
a reassurance of its own insecure collective identity. As new members or quasi-members convert
to the collective identity, it can restore confidence to the collectivity and be used as a strategy of
increasing legitimacy of the elites.
In the context of the EU, it can be argued that the EU externally promotes its institutional
identity consisting of its own procedures, regulations and institutions, which become transplanted
into third countries. This institutional identity differs from the symbolic European identity being
produced within the EU. Whereas symbolic identity draws on shared symbols of commonality such
as common currency, common anthem, common holidays or even common past (Section 4.1), insti-
tutional identity is based on specific institutions (in the larger sociological sense including norms,
procedures, regulations) and on the belief in the superiority of these institutions. In this sense, the
EU acts vis-a`-vis its neighbourhood as an identity hegemon, as it might have higher attractiveness
outside of the EU than it does within, given the EU’s current internal crisis. On the other hand,
identity hegemony might equally generate resistance to the EU identity politics, particularly if the
policies of the third countries towards the EU are instrumentally motivated (Karolewski 2011).
The EU promotes a European identity in its European neighborhood by “shaping conceptions of
the normal” (Manners 2002) as well as conceptions of the superior. While “conceptions of the
normal” legitimize the implementation of the EU’s own institutional rules, norms and standards
(as the appropriate ones) in neighboring countries, the “conceptions of the superior” promote the
EU self-images of normative superiority. Thus, the EU aims at spreading both norms of appro-
priateness and norms of superiority in third countries. As a consequence, European institutions,
procedures, norms and values become new rules of conduct for non-member states; their internal
institutions as well as policies are judged by the EU’s norms. Thus, by adopting these norms, third
countries also assume the institutional identity of the EU.
The external aspects of the EU’s identity generation, identity promotion and identity projection
pose a certain dilemma for the EU. The identity transfers take place successfully in the case of
countries to which the EU offers a membership perspective. However, the EU refuses to offer the
prospect of formal membership to some countries in its neighborhood such as Belarus, Ukraine or
Moldova but expects the countries to adopt the EU’s acquis communautaire. Regardless of whether
these countries are capable of joining the EU or even whether the EU is able to integrate them,
the lacking membership perspective undermines its credibility as a benevolent European identity
hegemon and thus the effectiveness of the EU’s external identity politics. Using the terminology
of S.N. Eisenstadt and Bernhard Giesen, the EU shows a missionary zeal on the one hand but
refuses to grant complete conversion on the other. Therefore, the EU weakens its own chances of
promoting the European identity abroad.
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5 Conclusions
This Living Review discussed the issue of European collective identity in the context of EU gov-
ernance. The literature on the subject is growing fast and becoming complex. Some issues – for
instance the debate on the relationship between the national and European identity – could not
be discussed in this Living Review in full length (see, however, Section 3.2.1). In this branch of
research on European identity, different models (including a competition model, a concordance
model and a sandwich model) are proposed and examined. More information on this debate can
be found in the Living Review by Loveless and Rohrschneider (2011).
Despite the growing complexity, there are still numerous problems with the research on Euro-
pean collective identity which have to be solved. While facing enormous challenges pertaining to
the lack of strong support among European citizens and the gulf between the elites and the EU
population, the European Union is vulnerable to unpredictable stress. However, the research on
European collective identity as a solution to this problem is still inconclusive. Even though the
emergence of a sense of community among European citizens is said to be a means of overcoming
centrifugal tendencies of the EU and its legitimacy problems, the EU is facing a serious dilemma.
On the one hand, EU governance has reached an advanced stage in which further European uni-
fication increasingly depends on the citizens’ consent. On the other hand, more democracy at the
European level is accompanied by the risk of tightening legitimacy problems of EU governance
as long as there is no resilient European sense of community among European citizens. There
are various proposals offering (sometimes implicit) solutions to this dilemma, including European
public space and European citizenship.
In addition, the very research on collective identity and EU governance is facing a number of
conceptual, methodological and normative challenges. First, problems still exist concerning how to
define collective identity. The ambiguity of the term “identity” is one of the greatest impairments
when it comes to its usefulness as an analytical category. Second, there are methodological problems
concerning the operationalization and measurement of collective identity. Not only can collective
identity be regarded as both an independent and dependent variable, but the measurement of the
very concept is still in its infancy, regardless of the large number of publications. Third, we are
facing normative issues as to how to assess the construction of an EU identity. Because the identity
technologies applied by the EU are administered in a top-down manner, citizens become “receivers”
of collective identity and the resulting identity construction might not be easily discernible from
collective brainwashing, which has the potential to exacerbate the legitimacy problems of EU
governance.
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